



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


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THE GERMAN WAR OF 1914.

UNIV. OF
CALIFORNIA

*Illustrated by Documents of
European History, 1815-1915*

SELECTED AND EDITED

BY

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1915

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PREFACE.

I am, I fear, solely responsible for the plan of this book and for the selections in it ; and for the English translations (except where otherwise stated). But I have received much kind help in the preparation of it, which it is now my pleasant duty to acknowledge. Much of my indebtedness is recorded at the beginnings of the several extracts ; but I have also to make many special acknowledgments :—To the Foreign Office, for the present of a number of published documents, and for hints as to the use of some of them ; to the Hon. W. P. Reeves, for his translations of the despatches of M. Venizelos, and for the loan of the Greek original ; to Sir F. Pollock, K.C., and to Mr. N. L. Frazer, for advice on questions of copyright ; to Mr. R. J. Mackenzie, of the *Times*,

ERRATUM.

pp. iii and 100 for MR. EDGAR ROWAN read
MR. ROBERT DONALD.

special point ; to Mr. L. H. Taylor, of the British Museum, for help in tracing some German documents ; to Miss L. A. O'Regan, for much help in copying documents ; and to my wife, for much help in their selection, copying, and translation. I have managed to avoid almost entirely the inclusion of any documents already available in the larger Source Book, *Readings from European History*, Vol. II., by Professor J. H. Robinson, of Columbia University, U.S.A. I have found it a very suggestive book. I have made much use of that excellent compilation Schilling's *Quellenbuch zur Geschichte der Neuzeit*. Of Mr. Mowat's *Select Treaties*, which covers part of the ground of my book, I first heard when all my own work was nearly finished. I have seen since the title of one of his selections, something about Switzerland. But I have postponed the reading of his book till after the publication of my own, from the fear of reviving that hopeless feeling one used to have at school, when one had seen a fair copy by Jebb or Sidgwick, before one had finished one's own verses.

J. O'R.

Marlborough,
1 July, 1915.

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TO VINDI
AMSONLIAO

STATEMENT

THE STATEMENT OF THE
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

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INTRODUCTION.

It is hoped that this book may be useful as a reference book to students of the War and its causes. The War is no isolated phenomenon; it has a long history. In the lives of nations, as of individuals, the present can be fully explained only by the past. The rise of modern Prussia begins with her just and successful struggle against Napoleon I.; the very existence of Belgium and Italy is a protest against the anti-national arrangements of the Congress of Vienna; the obligations of England to Belgium, in honour and interest, date from the Treaty of 1839; the House of Savoy has entered in 1915 on its final fight with Austria in the cause of Italian freedom; Europe is now, thanks to the folly of Turkey, in the last stage of the Near Eastern Question. The year 1815, then, is a convenient starting point. Methuselah, alone of mankind, could have made a comprehensive study of all the available material, official and unofficial. In editing the present selection, I have tried to be impartial in confining my notes, wherever it was possible, to statements of generally admitted facts, and leaving judgments on the documents to the reader; for any merit in this book must depend upon its unoriginality. Of course, a selection of documents is in itself a judgment, unavoidably so, and it is enough to be able to show cause for the choice. Thus in a book of limited selections I have rejected the Turkish manifesto in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, because it is falsified by the fact of the Bulgarian atrocities; and included the Russian, because it is a very truthful statement of the case. Such a virtue is, of course, very rare in manifestos, and I have generally included them for quite other reasons. They show the weak points of a case, by their omissions or perversions, and afford, sometimes unconsciously, interesting evidence of the characters and ideas of the nations and their rulers. But to include many of them would have forced me either to leave the reader the victim of the manifestos, or else to irritate him with a mass of notes, explaining, supplementing, and refuting. Three points have been specially illustrated in the selections, in the interests of historical truth. First, the utter loyalty of Belgium to her neutrality. Second, the good in the national character and policy of Russia, to which England, in a past now happily buried, was somewhat unjust. Third, the fact that in their present deadly struggle against the

German governing group of politicians and soldiers who have made this War, the Allies are in a very real sense contending "against spiritual wickedness in high places." The crimes against other nations committed by the rulers of Germany, in the creation and conduct of the War, are admittedly great. But not least is their crime against Germany itself. The only nation they have succeeded in deceiving is, unfortunately, their own. A comparison of the German White Book with the official documents published by the other Governments is sufficient to prove this, even without the further evidence. The German people possess many great and noble qualities; but the truth has been kept from them, and they have been fed on lies. Under the control of their present Government they resemble a man with great gifts of intellect and character, who is for the time the victim of diabolic possession.

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CHIEF DATES, 1815-1915.

[The Editor has found Hassall's *European History chronologically arranged*, 476-1910, a good reference book]

1815. Congress of Vienna completes the re-arrangement of Europe.
1823. The Monroe Doctrine.
1848. The Second French Republic.
- 1848-9. Unsuccessful risings against Austria in Hungary and Italy.
1852. Napoleon III. becomes Emperor of the French.
- 1854-6. The Crimean War.
1859. Successful war against Austria for Italian liberation, headed by Sardinia (as in 1848-9), and helped by France.
1860. Naples and Sicily freed by Garibaldi.
1861. The King of Sardinia becomes King of Italy.
1864. War of Austria and Prussia against Denmark.
1866. The Austro-Prussian War.
- 1870-1. The Franco-Prussian War.
1871. Foundation of the modern German Empire. The Third French Republic.
1878. The Berlin Congress. Creation of the modern Balkan States.
1882. The Triple Alliance founded.
1884. Beginning of German Colonial policy.
- 1884-91. Partition of Africa between the European Powers.
1895. Franco-Russian Alliance formed.
- 1899-1902. The Boer War.
1904. Anglo-French agreement for settlement of disputes.
1906. Crisis, caused by German attack on French policy in Morocco, is settled by international Conference at Algeiras.
1907. Anglo-Russian agreement for settlement of disputes. The Triple Entente founded.
1908. Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1911. Agadir crisis, caused by repetition of German policy of 1906, is settled by a Franco-German agreement.
1914. Austria declares war on Servia (July 28). Germany declares war on Russia (August 1) and on France (August 3). Germany invades Belgium (August 4). Great Britain declares war on Germany (August 4). Outbreak of the European War.

Art. II.—Consequently, the sole principle in force either between the said governments or between their subjects shall be that of rendering one another service, of bearing witness by a spirit of unchangeable good-will to the mutual affection by which it is their duty to be animated, of regarding one another in all cases solely in the light of members of one and the same Christian nation; the three allied princes looking upon themselves only as delegates of Providence for the government of three branches of the same family, to wit, Austria, Prussia and Russia, confessing also that the Christian nation of which they and their peoples form part, has really no other sovereign than Him to whom alone in right belongs all power, because in Him alone are all the treasures of love, knowledge and infinite wisdom, that is God, our Divine Saviour Jesus Christ, the Word of the Most High, the Word of Life. Their Majesties therefore urge their peoples with the most tender solicitude to adopt the sole means of enjoying that peace which springs from a good conscience and which alone is lasting, by a growing acquaintance with the principles and practice of the duties enjoined upon mankind in the teachings of the Divine Saviour.

Art. III.—All the Powers who are willing to make a solemn avowal of the sacred principles which have prompted the present instrument, and recognise how important it is for the happiness of the nations, disquieted too long, that these truths should exert henceforth all their due influence on the destinies of mankind, will be received with as much ardour as affection into this holy alliance.

Done in triplicate and signed at Paris in the year of grace 1815, (14) 26 September.

FRANCIS.
FREDERICK WILLIAM.
ALEXANDER.

2. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. The Monroe Doctrine, 1823.

Annual Register, 1823.†

[The Monroe Doctrine is generally spoken of as the corner stone of American foreign policy. It is based on the following passages which occur in the annual Message to Congress of President James Monroe, 2 Dec., 1823.]

In the discussions to which this interest* has given rise, and in the arrangements by which they may terminate, the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the

* *Negotiations with Russia and Gt. Britain about the rights of the three Governments in N.W. of N. America. Alaska was then a Russian possession.*

† *No reference is given to the pages of the Annual Register, because of its complicated system of paging. The student's easiest way is to go straight to the index of the annual volume.*

rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American Continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European Powers. . . . In the wars of the European Powers, in matters relating to themselves, we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do. It is only when our rights are invaded, or seriously menaced, that we resent injuries, or make preparation for our defence. . . . We owe it, therefore, to candour, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those Powers, to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European Power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.

But with the Governments who have declared their independence, and maintained it, and whose independence we have on great consideration and on just principles acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of opposing them or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European Power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States.*

3. The Independence of Greece procured by England, France and Russia, 1827-30.

Hertslet : II. p. 841.

[By the Treaty of London, 6th July, 1827, England, France and Russia combined to help the Greeks in their War of Independence against Turkey. On 20th Oct., 1827, the fleet of the three Allies destroyed the Turco-Egyptian Fleet at Navarino; in September, 1829, the Sultan recognised the independence of Greece (Treaty of Adrianople) and the following protocol of 3rd Feb., 1830, between England, France and Russia, and assented to by Turkey, settled the question finally.]

Art. I. Greece shall form an independent State, and shall enjoy all the rights, political, administrative and commercial, attached to complete Independence.

Art. III. The Greek Government shall be Monarchical and hereditary, according to the order of primogeniture. It shall be confided to a Prince, who shall not be capable of being chosen from among those of the families reigning in the States that signed the Treaty of 6th July, 1827, and who shall bear the title of Sovereign Prince of Greece. The choice of that Prince shall form the object of subsequent communications and stipulations.

* *This, the Monroe Doctrine, was due to the suggestion of the English Government, which opposed the principles of the Holy Alliance.*

Hassall : *European History*, 476-1910, p. 296.

Art. VIII.—No troops belonging to one of the contracting powers shall be allowed to enter the territory of the new Greek State without the consent of the two other courts that signed the Treaty.

4. Proclamation of the Independence of Belgium, 1830.

Annual Register, 1830.

[The Congress of Vienna, ignoring as usual national feeling, had given Belgium to Holland in 1815. The result is shown in the following speech of the Belgian Provisional Government at the opening of the National Congress, 10 Nov., 1830. With the help of England and France, the independence of Belgium was finally secured in 1839; and it was made, at the same time, a perpetually neutral State. Thus the cockpit of Western Europe was turned into a barrier against war.]

“ In the name of the Belgian people, the Provisional Government opens the Assembly of the Representatives of the nation.

The nation has confided to these representatives the august mission of founding, on the broad and solid basis of liberty, the edifice of the new social order, which will be the principle and the guarantee of durable happiness to Belgium.

You know, gentlemen, that at the time of our union with Holland, a Fundamental Law was presented to an assembly of notables chosen by the government not to examine, discuss, modify, and, lastly, accept it, and to make it the condition of a compact between the people and the head of the State, but solely and implicitly to submit to it, or totally to reject it. It was rejected, as might have been expected from the good sense and integrity of the Belgians, but by an unparalleled subterfuge it was declared to be accepted, and a constitution imposed by Holland oppressed our country.

If at least this Fundamental Law had been sincerely executed, in all its parts, with time, perhaps, and by the aid of the progress which arbitrary conduct of ministers compelled us daily to make in the career of constitutional opposition, it might have become the hope of Belgian liberty.

But, far from this, conscience violated, instruction fettered, the press condemned to be nothing more than an instrument of Government, or forced to silence, the arbitrary substitution of the regime of decrees (*arrêtes*) to the legal system established by the social compact, the right of petition disregarded, the confusion of all powers which were become the property of one—the despotical imposition of a privileged language—the power of removing (*amovibilité*) the judges degraded to act the part of commissioners of government—the complete absence of the guarantee of publicity,

and of that of the jury—an enormous debt and expenditure, the only portion which Holland brought us at the time of our deplorable union—taxes overwhelming by their amount, and still more by the manner in which they were apportioned, which was wholly unpopular, wholly bearing on the indigent classes—laws always voted by the Dutch for Holland only, and always against Belgium, represented so unequally in the States-General—the seat of all important establishments fixed in Holland—the scandalous misapplication of the funds specially destined to favour manufactures, and, lastly, the most offensive partiality in the distribution of civil and military employments, by a government in whose eye the name of Belgium was a disgrace; in a word, all Belgium treated as a conquered province, as a colony—everything, gentlemen, rendered a revolution necessary and inevitable, and hastened its approach.

Such just and real grievances could not but ensure the result of it.

We had risen against despotism to reconquer our rights, and we were treated by tyranny as rebels. Our cities burnt—the most barbarous treatment even of old men and of women—the rights of humanity, the laws of war, trampled under foot, testify the ferocity of our enemy, and call down blessings on the victory of the people, which has cleared our territory of them.

The fruit of this victory was independence. The people has declared it through us. As the organ of its wishes, the Provisional Government has called you together, gentlemen, to consolidate it for ever.”

5. THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM.

The Treaty of London, 1839.

Hertslet: Map of Europe by Treaty, II., p. 979.

[Treaty between Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia on the one part, and The Netherlands on the other. Signed at London, 19 April, 1839.]

Art. VII.—Belgium, within the limits specified in Articles I., II. and IV., shall form an independent and perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States.

6. The Foundation of the Second French Republic, 1848.

Annual Register, 1848.

The Final Scene in the Chamber of Deputies.

[Debate in the French Chamber of Deputies, 24 Feb., 1848, which resulted in the abolition of the Monarchy of Louis Philippe. This Republic was finally overthrown by Louis Napoleon, by his *coup d'état* of 2 Dec., 1851. There is a family likeness between the First, Second and Third Republics at the outset of their careers. The Third Republic of twentieth century France is a curious contrast to all, its own youth in 1871 included.]

M. CRÉMIEUX : “ We cannot at the present moment do more than establish a Provisional Government. (Cries of “ No ! No ! ”) I have the greatest respect for the Duchess of Orleans, and I just now conducted the Royal Family to the carriage which bore them away.”

A VOICE : “ Bon voyage ” !

M. CRÉMIEUX : “ The population of Paris has shown the most profound respect for the King’s misfortunes, but we who have been sent here to enact laws cannot violate them. A law already voted disposes of the regency, and I cannot admit that it can be abrogated at this moment. Since we have come to the point of undergoing a revolution, let us confide ourselves to the country. I propose a Provisional Government of five members.”

M. BARROT : “ Never have we had need of more coolness and patriotism. May we be all united in one sentiment—that of saving our country from the most dreadful visitation—a civil war. . . . The Crown of July rests on the head of a child and a woman. [Great tumult.] It is a solemn appeal. For my part, what I conceive to be most fitting for the situation is this—the Regency of the Duchess of Orleans, a Ministry chosen from the most tried opinions, and an appeal to the country, which will pronounce with full liberty, to an extent sanctioned by law.”

[Soon afterwards an immense crowd burst into the Chamber, armed with swords, and pikes, and muskets, and bearing tri-coloured flags.]

M. LEDRU ROLLIN : “ In the name of the people, I protest against the kind of Government which has just been proposed to you. (Deafening shouts of applause.) I do so in the name of the citizens whom I see before me—who for the last two days have been fighting, and who will, if necessary, again combat this evening. [Arms were here brandished, and muskets raised to the shoulder, amidst a scene of indescribable tumult.] I demand in the name of the people that a Provisional Government be named.”

7. Proclamation of the Independence of Hungary, 1849.

Annual Register, 1849.

14 APRIL, 1849.

I. Hungary, together with Transylvania, and all parts, countries and provinces appertaining thereunto, is and shall be a free and independent European State. The territory of the whole of this said Hungarian State is indivisible and its integrity inviolable.

II. The House of Hapsburg-Lorraine, by its treason, perjury and armed aggression on the Hungarian nation, and, further, by

the audacity which prompted it to divide the area of the country, to separate Transylvania and Croatia from Hungary, to annihilate the independent political existence of the country, and to raise an armed power for the purpose of murdering the nation—by these and many other gross crimes and enormities has the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine broken the Pragmatic Sanction, and every other tie which joined the two countries of Austria and Hungary. In consequence of which, this perjured House of Hapsburg-Lorraine is and shall be excluded, and deposed and banished, now and for ever, from the dominion, sovereignty, and enjoyment of the territories of Hungary, as well as of Transylvania, and all the parts countries and provinces thereunto appertaining. And the said House is and shall be declared in the name of the nation to have forfeited the throne, and to be excluded and disowned and banished.

III. The said Hungarian nation enters, according to its unalienable natural rights, as an independent and free State, into the family of European States; and the said nation resolves to declare and protest, and hereby does declare and protest, viz., that it will live in peace and amity with all other States that shall abstain from violating its rights, but especially with those peoples which formerly were joined with the said nation under a common Sovereign, as well as with the Turkish Empire and the States of Italy.

The new Hungarian State, the work of Kossuth, was overthrown by Austria in the same year. In 1867 Hungary was raised to partnership with Austria, and the Dual Monarchy was established.

8. Proclamation of the Roman Republic, 1849.

Annual Register, 1849.

8 FEB., 1849.

“Art. I.—Papacy has fallen, de facto and de jure, from the temporal throne of the Roman State.

Art. II.—The Roman Pontiff shall enjoy all the guarantees necessary for the exercise of his spiritual power.

Art. III.—The Government of the Roman State is to be a pure democracy and to assume the glorious name of the Roman Republic.

Art. IV.—The Roman Republic shall maintain with the rest of Italy relations required by a common nationality.”

The head of the new Republic was its creator, Mazzini. Attacked by the French troops sent to help the Pope, it fell within five months, in spite of the heroic resistance of Garibaldi.

9. The Russo-Turkish War (the Crimean War), 1854.

From French Translation in *Annual Register*, 1854.

[Address of the Metropolitan of Moscow to the soldiers of the 16th Infantry Division, who were about to march against the Turks.]

“Children of our Sovereign and Father, children of our Mother Russia, my warrior brothers,

Your Czar, your country, your Christian faith summon you to the fight. The prayers of the Church and of your country go with you.

The enemy we conquered under Catherine, under Alexander, under Nicholas, is again challenging Russia; and your companions in arms have already begun to conquer him by land and sea, as in the days of old.

And if Providence decrees that you too should meet him, you will not forget that you are fighting for our godly Sovereign and our dear country against the unbelievers, against the oppressors of nations who are of our faith, and almost our fellow-countrymen; against the profaners of the holy places which we worship—the scenes of the Nativity, of the Passion, and of the Resurrection of Our Saviour.

And now, more than ever, glory and blessing to the conquerors, happiness and blessing to those who offer the sacrifice of their lives with faith in the Lord, with love for their Sovereign and their country.

Scripture speaks thus of the defenders of their country in old time: ‘Through faith thou shalt subdue kingdoms.’ And so we send you on your way with our prayers and the blessings of the Church.

The great and time-honoured intercessor for Russia, the blessed Sergius, bestowed his benediction of old on the victorious troops that marched against the oppressors of our country; his holy image went before our legions under the Czar Alexis and under Peter the Great, and lastly under Alexander at that memorable time of our struggle against twenty different nations. May this image of the blessed Sergius go with you also, as the token of his intercession for you and of his prayers for those who are strong in the Lord! Keep, then, in your hearts these warlike and triumphant words of the Prophet David: ‘In God is my salvation and my glory.’ ”

10. Garibaldi and England.

Published in *The Northern Tribune*, 1854: Vol. I.

[In 1854 Garibaldi had been received with great enthusiasm in England and presented with a sword of honour. On leaving, he wrote the following letter to Mr. Joseph Cowen, afterwards M.P. for Newcastle-on-Tyne.]

SHIP "COMMONWEALTH," TYNEMOUTH,

April 12th, 1854.

MY DEAR COWEN,

The generous manifestation of sympathy with which I have been honoured by you and your fellow-citizens is of itself more than sufficient to recompense a life of the greatest merit.

Born and educated, as I have been, in the cause of humanity, my heart is entirely devoted to liberty—universal liberty—national and world-wide—"ora e sempre" [now and for ever].

England is a great and powerful nation—independent of auxiliary aid—foremost in human progress—enemy to despotism—the only safe refuge of the exile—friend of the oppressed; but if ever England, your native country, should be so circumstanced as to require the help of an ally, cursed be that Italian who would not step forward with me in her defence.

Your Government has given the Autocrat a check and the Austrian a lesson. The despots of Europe are against you in consequence. Should England at any time in a just cause need my arm, I am ready to unsheathe in her defence the noble and splendid sword received at your hands.

Be the interpreter of my gratitude to your good and generous countrymen. I regret, deeply regret, to leave without again grasping hands with you. Farewell, my dear friend, but not adieu! Make room for me in your heart.

Yours always and everywhere,

G. GARIBALDI.

Jos. Cowen, Junr.,
Blaydon Burn.

P.S.—At Rio de la Plata I fought in favour of the English against the tyrant Rosas.

11. THE LIBERATION OF ITALY, 1859.

The King of Sardinia calls the Italians to Arms.

Annual Register, 1859.

[Proclamation of Victor Emmanuel to the Italians, counter-signed by Cavour, 27 April 1859.]

“Austria, who boasts of her love for peace, attacks us by refusing to submit to a European Congress. She violates the promises made to England; she asks us to reduce our Army, and to abandon those brave volunteers who have thronged from every part of Italy to defend the sacred flag of Italian independence. I intrust the cares of government to my well-loved cousin, and draw my sword.

Side by side with our soldiers will fight for liberty and justice those valiant troops of the Emperor Napoleon, my generous ally. People of Italy! Austria attacks Piedmont because she maintained the cause of our common country in the councils of Europe, and because she was not insensible to your groans of agony. Austria now publicly tears to pieces treaties which she never respected. Henceforth, by right, the Italian nation is free, and I may conscientiously fulfil the oath I took upon my father's grave.

Let us place confidence in Providence, in our union, in the bravery of Italian soldiers, in the alliance of the noble French nation. Let us trust in public opinion. I have no other ambition than to be the first soldier of Italian independence. Long live Italy!”

12. Napoleon III. explains to the French people his motives for war against Austria in the cause of Italy, May, 1859.

From original in *Moniteur Universel*, 4 May, 1859.

[The relations of France to Italy from 1859 to 1882 may be summarised as follows:—

Napoleon III., while yet an exile from France, had fought in his youth in the cause of Italian freedom, as a volunteer in the unsuccessful rising in 1831. It was natural (as even Austria admitted) to find him on the same side in 1859. His sudden withdrawal from the war in two months, taking with him Savoy and Nice, with his promise to free Italy only half fulfilled, may be fairly attributed to a less ideal motive, which assails all rulers, the imperative desire to sacrifice all other considerations to the interests of his country and of his dynasty.

His support, continued till his own fall in 1870, of the Papal temporal power, which had for a thousand years been the fatal bar to Italian unity, increased the estrangement of Italy. This was completed by the anti-Italian policy of France in Tunis in 1881. Bismarck seized the opportunity to draw Italy into the Austro-German orbit, by the formation of the Triple Alliance in May, 1882.]

PROCLAMATION.

THE EMPEROR

TO THE FRENCH PEOPLE :

Frenchmen !

Austria, by causing her army to enter the territory of the King of Sardinia, our Ally, is declaring war on us. She is thus violating treaties, and justice, and threatening our frontiers. All the Great Powers have protested against this aggression. Piedmont having accepted terms which ought to have assured peace, we are forced to ask ourselves the possible reason for this sudden invasion. It is that Austria has brought matters to such a pass that either her domination must extend to the Alps, or Italy must be free to the Adriatic ; for in that country, every corner of land that remains free is a danger to her power. Till now moderation has been the rule of my conduct ; now energetic action becomes my first duty. Let France arm, and tell Europe resolutely : “ I desire no conquests, but I desire to maintain firmly my national and traditional policy ; I keep treaties, provided they are kept towards me ; I respect the territory and the rights of neutral Powers ; but I make no secret of my sympathy for a people whose history is blended with our own, and who groan under foreign oppression. . . . The end of this war, then, is to restore Italy to herself, not to change her master, and we shall have on our frontiers a friendly people, who will owe their freedom to us.

We are not going to Italy to foment disorder or to overthrow the power of the Holy Father, whom we put back on his throne, but to free him from that foreign pressure which weighs on all the Peninsula, and to help in establishing there order based on the satisfaction of legitimate interests. Finally we are going to that classic ground, made famous by so many victories, to seek for traces of our fathers. God grant that we may prove worthy of them. I go shortly to put myself at the head of the army. . . .

Courage, then, and union ! Once more our country is about to show to the world that it is not degenerate. Providence will bless our efforts ; for that cause is holy in the eyes of God which rests on justice, on humanity ; on the love of country and of freedom.

NAPOLEON.

Palace of the Tuileries,

3 May, 1859.

13. The Austrian point of view, 1859.

Annual Register, 1859.

[From report by Lord A. Loftus, British Ambassador at Vienna, to the Foreign Office. Count Buol, the Austrian Minister, gave the following reply to the British suggestion, of 12 January, that Austria and France should "join heartily with a view to promote, by peaceful means, the regeneration of Italy."]

"The truth is, we can never come to an understanding with France on Italian affairs, for we start from two different points:—First, we do not consider France to be an Italian Power; secondly, France sympathises with and protects the cause of nationalities, whereas we support that of the Sovereigns, Governments and of established order; therefore, there can be no basis on which to found a concert or perfect co-operation. Nor is it necessary. It is a great mistake to think that Italy requires a change. If Italy is left quiet, if agitation is put down, and if the hopes of certain parties who only seek their own aggrandizement are annulled, there will be no commotion, no war in Italy, and no cause for the measures which are counselled in the despatch you have read to me."

[Later on, at the end of April, Count Buol expressed this, the obvious Austrian standpoint, in a circular note to the Powers:—]

Austria is a conservative Power, with whom religion, morality and historical right are sacred. It knows how to estimate, to protect, and to weigh in the scales of equality, what is noble and legitimate in the national spirit of nations. Her extensive dominions consist of different races, of different languages; the Emperor embraces them all in the same love, and their union under the sceptre of our august dynasty is advantageous to the whole of the great family of European nations; but the pretension of forming new States, according to the limits of nationalities, is the most dangerous of all utopian schemes.

To put forward such a pretension is to break with history; and to seek to carry it into execution in any point of Europe is to shake to its foundations the firmly organized order of States, and to threaten the Continent with subversion and chaos.

14. The Policy of Bismarck.

[The long political life of Bismarck was devoted to the development of the power and welfare of Prussia, and of Germany under Prussia. These objects he accomplished mainly by three wars, against Denmark, Austria, and France. After his dismissal from office by the Emperor William II., in 1890, he occupied himself till his death, in 1898, in composing his memoirs, in which he reviews his policy.]

From *Bismarck : The Man and the Statesman*.
(English translation in two volumes, by
A. J. Butler and others, 1898).
Quoted by permission of the publishers.
Messrs. Smith, Elder & Co.

The Unification of Germany.

We should get no nearer the goal by speeches, associations, decisions of majorities ; we should be unable to avoid a serious contest which could only be settled by blood and iron. (I., pp. 309-10.)

During the time that I was in office I advised three wars, the Danish, the Bohemian and the French ; but every time I first made myself clear whether the war, if it were successful, would bring a prize of victory worth the sacrifices which every war requires, and which now are so much greater than in the last century. Had I had to say to myself that after one of these wars we should find some difficulty in discovering conditions of peace which were desirable, I should scarcely have convinced myself of the necessity for these sacrifices as long as we were not actually attacked. (II., p. 290).

Prussian Policy towards Austria, after 1866.

We had to avoid wounding Austria too severely ; we had to avoid leaving behind in her any unnecessary bitterness of feeling or desire for revenge ; we ought rather to reserve the possibility of becoming friends again with our adversary of the moment, and in any case to regard the Austrian state as a piece on the European chessboard and the renewal of friendly relations with her as a move open to us. If Austria were severely injured, she would become the ally of France and of every other opponent of ours ; she would even sacrifice her anti-Russian interests for the sake of revenge on Prussia. . . . (II., pp. 48-49).

Austria's conflict in rivalry with us was no more culpable than ours with her ; *our task was the establishment or initiation of German national unity under the leadership of the King of Prussia*. (II., p. 50).

France and Prussia, after 1866.

That a war with France would succeed that with Austria lay in the logic of history, even had we been able to allow the Emperor Napoleon the petty expenses which he looked for from us as a reward for his neutrality. (II., p. 41).

Alliances, after 1871.

The idea of coalitions [against Germany] gave me nightmares. (II., p. 252).

The English Constitution does not admit of alliances of assured permanence. (II., p. 253).

With France we shall never have peace ; with Russia never the necessity for war, unless Liberal stupidities or dynastic blunders falsify the situation. . . . (I., p. 244.)

I regard it as no less enjoined upon us to cultivate neighbourly relations with Russia after, than before, our defensive alliance with Austria. (II., p. 273).

Loyalty to Treaties.

All contracts between great states cease to be unconditionally binding as soon as they are tested by the "struggle for existence." No great nation will ever be induced to sacrifice its existence on the altar of fidelity to contract when it is compelled to choose between the two. The maxim "ultra posse nemo obligatur" holds good in spite of all treaty formulas whatsoever, nor can any treaty guarantee the degree of zeal and the amount of force that will be devoted to the discharge of obligations when the private interest of those who lie under them no longer reinforces the text and its earliest interpretation. (II., p. 270).

Are preventive wars justifiable? Attitude of the German military caste towards Foreign Policy.

In both cases* his [Moltke's] love of combat and delight in battles were a great support to me in carrying out the policy I regarded as necessary, in opposition to the intelligible and justifiable aversion in a most influential quarter.† It proved inconvenient to me in 1867, in the Luxemburg question, and in 1875 and afterwards on

* *The Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian Wars.*

† *King William I.*

the question whether it was desirable, as regards a war which we should probably have to face sooner or later, to bring it on *anticipando* before the adversary could improve his preparations. I have always opposed the theory which says "yes"; not only at the Luxemburg period, but likewise subsequently for twenty years, in the conviction that even victorious wars cannot be justified unless they are forced upon one, and that one cannot see the cards of Providence far enough ahead to anticipate historical development according to one's own calculation. It is natural that in the staff of the army not only younger active officers, but likewise experienced strategists, should feel the need of turning to account the efficiency of the troops led by them, and their own capacity to lead, and of making them prominent in history. It would be a matter of regret if this effect of the military spirit did not exist in the army; the task of keeping its results within such limits as the nations' need of peace can justly claim is the duty of the political, not the military, heads of the state. That at the time of the Luxemburg question, during the crisis of 1875, invented by Gortchakoff and France, and even down to the most recent times, the staff and its leaders have allowed themselves to be led astray and to endanger peace, lies in the very spirit of the institution, which I would not forego. It only becomes dangerous under a monarch whose policy lacks sense of proportion and power to resist one-sided and constitutionally unjustifiable influences. (II., pp. 101-2.)

15. The projected Treaty between France and Prussia, 20 Aug., 1866.

Original in *Times*, 25 July, 1870.

Translated in *Annual Register*, 1870.

[After the Prussian victory over Austria in 1866, Napoleon III. demanded compensations for his friendly neutrality during the war, and for the increase of Prussian power. Bismarck refused his first demand (for a cession of German territory along the Rhine), but held out hopes of "other means of satisfying you." Napoleon accordingly made fresh proposals on 20 August, 1866; Bismarck discussed them seriously, dropped them as soon as Prussia's position was secure, kept the draft, and published it in the *Times* in 1870, six days after the French declaration of war on Prussia.* The effect on English public opinion was great. The British Government hastened to safeguard the independence of Belgium by concluding identic Treaties with France and Prussia, which were ratified on 26 August, 1870.]

*See *Bismarck* by J. W. Headlam, pp. 277-288.

Art. I.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French acquiesces in and recognises the gains made by Prussia in the course of the last war waged by her against Austria and that Power's allies.

Art. II.—His Majesty the King of Prussia engages to facilitate the acquisition by France of Luxemburg; and for this purpose His Majesty will enter into negotiations with His Majesty the King of the Netherlands with the view of inducing him to cede his sovereign rights over the Duchy to the Emperor of the French, on the terms of such compensation as shall be judged adequate or otherwise. The Emperor of the French, on his side, engages to assume whatever pecuniary charges this arrangement may involve.

Art. III.—His Majesty the Emperor of the French shall raise no opposition to a federal union of the Confederation of North Germany with the States of South Germany, excepting Austria, and this federal union may be based on one common Parliament, due reservation, however, being made of the sovereignty of the said States.

Art. IV.—His Majesty the King of Prussia, on his side, in case His Majesty the Emperor of the French should be led by circumstances to cause his troops to enter Belgium or to conquer it, shall grant armed aid to France, and shall support her with all his forces, military and naval, in the face of and against every Power which should, in this eventuality, declare war.

Art. V.—To ensure the complete execution of the preceding conditions, His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Majesty the Emperor of the French contract, by the present Treaty, an alliance offensive and defensive, which they solemnly engage to maintain. Their Majesties bind themselves, besides and in particular, to observe its terms in all cases when their respective States, the integrity of which they reciprocally guarantee, may be threatened with attack; and they shall hold themselves bound, in any like conjuncture, to undertake without delay, and under no pretext to decline, whatever military arrangements may be enjoined by their common interest conformably to the terms and provisions above declared.

[The original of Art. IV. is as follows:—]

Art. IV.—De son côté, Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, au cas où Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français serait amené par les circonstances à faire entrer ses troupes en Belgique ou à la conquérir, accordera le secours de ses armes à la France, et il la soutiendra avec toutes ses forces de terre et de mer, envers et contre toute Puissance qui, dans cette éventualité, lui déclarerait la guerre.

16. THE NEUTRALITY OF LUXEMBURG.

[After the separation of Belgium from Holland in 1839, Belgium retained part of Luxemburg; but the present Grand Duchy remained attached to Holland until 1890. It then passed under the Luxemburg law of succession to another branch of the family of Orange-Nassau.

Its international importance lay in its position, and in the great strength of the fortress of Luxemburg, its capital. By the arrangements of the Congress of Vienna in 1815 the fortress was garrisoned by Prussian troops on behalf of the German Confederation. The dissolution of the Confederation in 1866 after the Austro-Prussian War severed the political connexion of Luxemburg with Germany, but the Prussian troops remained. The subsequent attempts of Napoleon III. to acquire the Grand Duchy nearly involved him in war with Germany in 1867. Ultimately the matter was settled by a Conference of the Powers at London. The Grand Duchy was neutralised, on the proposal of Prussia. The guarantee was made collective, on the proposal of England, instead of being individual, as in the case of Belgium. The distinction became important in 1914. 'The Secretary of State reminded me that the Convention of 1867, referring to the Grand Duchy, differed from the Treaty referring to Belgium, in that England was bound to require the observance of this latter Convention without the assistance of the other guaranteeing Powers, while with regard to Luxemburg all the guaranteeing Powers were to act in concert.'

(Despatch from the French Ambassador at London to his Government, 2 Aug., 1914. *French Yellow Book*, No. 137.)

The Treaty of London, 1867.

Hertslet: III. p. 1803.

[The Powers guaranteeing the Neutrality of Luxemburg were Great Britain, France, Austria, Prussia, Russia, Belgium and Italy.]

Art. II.—The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, within the Limits determined by the Act annexed to the Treaties of 19th April, 1839, under the guarantee of the Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia, shall henceforth form a perpetually neutral State. It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other States.

The High Contracting Parties engage to respect the principle of neutrality stipulated by the present Article. That principle is, and remains placed under the sanction of the collective guarantee of the Powers signing Parties to the present Treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral State.

Art. III.—The Grand Duchy being neutralised, the maintenance or establishment of Fortresses upon its Territory becomes without necessity as well as without object. In consequence it is agreed

that the City of Luxemburg, considered in times past as a Federal Fortress, shall cease to be a fortified city. The King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain in that city the number of troops necessary to maintain order.

Art. IV.—H.M. the King of Prussia declares that his troops actually in garrison in the Fortress of Luxemburg shall receive orders to evacuate that place immediately after ratification of present Treaty.

Art V.—H.M. the Grand Duke engages on his part to take the necessary measures for converting the said Fortress into an open city. H.M. the King Grand Duke promises, moreover, that the fortifications of the City of Luxemburg shall not be restored in future, and that no military establishment shall be there maintained or created.

During the war between France and Prussia in 1870, 1871, those Powers mutually engaged to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg.

17. France declares War on Prussia, 19 July, 1870.

From French Text in Quellenbuch, p. 464.

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, being unable to look upon the plan of raising a Prussian Prince to the throne of Spain in any other light than that of a design against the territorial security of France, found itself obliged to ask His Majesty the King of Prussia for an assurance that such a project could not be realised with his assent.

H.M. the King of Prussia having refused to give this assurance, and having, on the contrary, stated to the Ambassador of H.M. the Emperor of the French his intention to reserve to himself for this, as well as for all other contingencies, the liberty of being guided by circumstances, the Imperial Government is obliged to see in the King's declaration a reservation which threatens both France and the balance of power in Europe.

This declaration has been made still worse by the circular Note to the Cabinets informing them of the refusal to receive the Ambassador of the Emperor, or to enter into any further explanations with him. The Government of His Imperial Majesty, therefore, has decided that it is obliged to take immediate steps in defence of its honour and of its injured interests, and being resolved to take, for this purpose, all the measures dictated by the situation in which it has been placed, it considers itself, from the present moment, at war with Prussia.

18. BELGIAN NEUTRALITY.

Debates in the British Parliament, 1870.

Hansard: Parliamentary Debates, vol. 306, p. 1387.

[House of Lords Debate, 2 Aug., 1870.]

EARL RUSSELL: "I ask myself, then, what course we should pursue? The only answer I can make is that it is not a question of three courses or of different paths. There is but one course and one path, namely, the course of honour and the path of honour, which we ought to pursue. We are bound, then, to defend Belgium. I am told that that may lead us into danger. Now, in the first place, I deny that any great danger would exist if this country manfully declared her intention to perform all her engagements, and not to shrink from their performance. I am persuaded that neither France nor Prussia would ever attempt to violate the independence of Belgium. . . . I am persuaded that both would conform to the faith of treaties, and would not infringe on the territory of Belgium, but to the end of the war remain in the fulfilment of their obligations. When the choice is between honour and infamy, I cannot doubt that H.M. Government will pursue the course of honour, the only one worthy of the British people. The British people have a very strong sense of honour and of what is due to this glorious nation. I feel sure, therefore, that the Government, in making that intention clear to all the world, would have the entire support of the great majority of this nation. I need hardly speak of other considerations which are of great weight. I consider that if England shrunk from the performance of her engagements, if she acted in a faithless manner with respect to this matter, her extinction as a great power must very soon follow."

EARL GRANVILLE (Foreign Secretary): "Her Majesty's Government are not unaware of the duty this country owes to the independence and the neutrality of Belgium."

Hansard: vol. 306, p. 1776.

[House of Commons, 10 Aug., 1870.]

MR. GLADSTONE (Prime Minister): "While we have recognized the interest of England, we have never looked upon it as the sole motive, or even as the greatest of those considerations which have urged us forward. There is, I admit, the obligation of the Treaty. There is also the common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizements of any power whatever. But there is one other

motive which I shall place at the head of all, that attaches peculiarly to the preservation of the independence of Belgium. What is that country? It is a country containing 4 or 5 millions of people, with much of an historic past, and imbued with a sentiment of nationality and a spirit of independence as warm and as genuine as that which beats in the hearts of the proudest and most powerful nations. By the regulation of its internal concerns, amid the shocks of revolution, Belgium, through all the crises of the age, has set to Europe the example of a good and stable government gracefully associated with the widest possible extension of the liberty of the people. Looking at a country such as that, is there any man who hears me who does not feel that, if in order to satisfy a greedy appetite for aggrandizement, coming whence it may, Belgium were absorbed, the day that witnessed that absorption would hear the knell of public right and public law in Europe? But we have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether, under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed, as it is, with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history, and thus become participators in the sin?"

The Belgian Neutrality Treaty between England and Prussia, 1870.

Annual Register, 1870.

[Signed at London, August 9th, 1870; ratifications exchanged at London, August 26th, 1870.]

Art. I.—His Majesty the King of Prussia having declared that, notwithstanding the hostilities in which the North German Confederation is engaged with France, it is his fixed determination to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as the same shall be respected by France, Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland on her part declares that, if during the said hostilities the armies of France should violate that neutrality she will be prepared to co-operate with His Prussian Majesty for the defence of the same in such manner as may be mutually agreed upon, employing for that purpose her naval and military forces to insure its observance, and to maintain, in conjunction with His Prussian Majesty then and thereafter, the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

It is clearly understood that Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland does not engage herself by this Treaty to take part in any of the general operations of the war now carried on between the North German Confederation and France, beyond the limits of Belgium, as defined in the Treaty between Belgium and the Netherlands of April 19th, 1839.

Art. II.—His Majesty the King of Prussia agrees on his part, in the event provided for in the foregoing Article, to co-operate with Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, employing his naval and military forces for the purpose aforesaid ; and, the case arising, to concert with Her Majesty the measures which shall be taken, separately or in common, to secure the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

Art. III.—This Treaty shall be binding on the High Contracting Parties during the continuance of the present war between the North German Confederation and France, and for twelve months after the ratification of any Treaty of Peace concluded between those Parties ; and on the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the High Contracting Parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on the first Article of the Quintuple Treaty of the 19th of April, 1839.

Art. IV.—The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at London as soon as possible.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same, and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at London, the ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy.

GRANVILLE.

BERNSTORFF.

A similar Treaty between England and France was signed on the 11th and ratified on the 26th August at London.

19. Surrender of the Emperor Napoleon III., at Sedan, 1870.

Quellenbuch p. 481.

Letter of Napoleon to King William.

Monsieur mon frère !

N'ayant pas pu mourir au milieu de mes troupes, il ne me reste qu'à remettre mon épée entre les mains de Votre Majesté.

Je suis de Votre Majesté le bon frère.

Sedan, le 1er septembre 1870

NAPOLÉON.

King William's Reply.

Monsieur mon frère !

En regrettant les circonstances dans lesquelles nous nous rencontrons, j'accepte l'épée de Votre Majesté, et je la prie de vouloir bien nommer un de vos officiers muni de vos pleins pouvoirs pour traiter de la capitulation de l'armée qui s'est si bravement battue sous vos ordres. De mon côté, j'ai désigné le général de Moltke à cet effet.

Je suis de Votre Majesté le bon frère,

Devant Sedan, le 1er septembre, 1870.

GUILLAUME.

20. The Completion of Italian Unity, 1870.

Annual Register, 1870.

[Speech of King Victor Emanuel to the Italian Parliament, 5 Dec., 1870.]

With Rome for our capital, I have fulfilled my promise, and crowned the enterprise which was begun twenty-three years ago by my magnanimous father. Italy is free and united henceforth, and depends upon herself alone, making her great and happy.

Bound to France and Prussia by recent alliances, we were obliged to observe a rigorous neutrality. We are able to interpose an impartial word between the belligerents, joining our efforts to those of other neutral Powers in order to put a stop to a war which ought never to have broken out between two nations, the greatness of which is equally necessary to civilization. This policy proves once more that free, united Italy is for Europe an element of order, liberty and peace.

This attitude made easier the task of restoring Rome to herself, to Italy, and to the modern world. We entered Rome by our national right, and we shall remain there, keeping the promises solemnly made to ourselves of freedom to the Church and the independence of the Holy See in its spiritual ministry and its relations with Catholicity.

The Papacy has consistently refused to acquiesce in the abolition of its temporal power.

21. The Completion of German Unity, 1871.

German Text in *Quellenbuch*, p. 486.

TO THE GERMAN PEOPLE.

WE WILLIAM

BY THE GRACE OF GOD KING OF PRUSSIA

Since the German Princes and Free Cities have addressed to Us a unanimous call to renew and assume, by the restoration of the German Empire, the German Imperial dignity, which has been in abeyance for more than sixty years, and since the requisite constitutional preliminaries in the North German Confederation have been settled, make known hereby that We have considered it a duty towards our common country to obey this call of the confederate German Princes and the Cities, and to assume the German Imperial dignity.

Accordingly We and Our successors to the Crown of Prussia henceforth bear the Imperial title in Our relations and concerns with the German Empire, and hope to God that it may be given to the German nation to guide their country to a blissful future under the ensign of its ancient glory.

We accept the Imperial dignity in the consciousness of the duty it imposes of protecting with German loyalty the rights of the Empire and of its members, of defending the independence of Germany, supported by the united force of its people. We assume it in the hope that it will be granted to the German people to enjoy the reward of their severe and self-sacrificing conflicts in lasting peace, and within those boundaries which guarantee our country that security against renewed attacks by France, of which it has been deprived for centuries.

May God grant to Us and to our successors to the Imperial Crown to be at all times Increasers of the Empire,* not by warlike conquests, but by the blessings and gifts of peace, in the sphere of national welfare, freedom and civilisation.

WILLIAM.

Given at Headquarters, Versailles, 18th January, 1871.

* *An ancient medieval title of the German Emperors of the Holy Roman Empire.*

22. The Peace of Frankfurt, 1871.

German Text in *Quellenbuch*, p. 495.

Art. VI.—Those French subjects who, being natives of, and at present residing in, the ceded provinces,* purpose to retain their French nationality, are authorised up to 1st October, 1872, in virtue

* *Alsace-Lorraine.*

of making a previous declaration to the competent authority, to remove their place of abode to France and settle there.

Art. VII.—The payment of twenty million pounds shall be made within the 30 days, which follow the complete restoration of the authority of the French Government in the City of Paris. Forty millions shall be paid in the course of the year, and twenty millions on 1st May, 1872. The remaining 120 millions fall due on 2nd March, 1874, according to the agreement made by the preliminary Treaty of Peace. Commencing with March 2nd of the current year, the interest of this 120 millions shall be paid every year on March 3rd at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum. After payment of the first twenty millions and the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace, the departments of the Somme, Seine Inférieure and Eure, so far as they are still occupied by the German troops, shall be evacuated.

The evacuation of the departments of the Oise, Seine-et-Oise, Seine-et-Marne, and Seine, as well as of the forts of Paris, shall take place as soon as the German Government considers the restoration of order both in France and in Paris sufficient to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken by France.

In any case, this evacuation will take place on payment of the third sum of twenty millions.

Art. X.— . . . It is agreed that the armies of Paris and of Versailles, after the restoration of the authority of the French Government in Paris, and till the evacuation of the forts by the German troops, shall not exceed 80,000 men.

Until this evacuation the French Government may not concentrate troops on the right bank of the Loire. It will, however, provide for the regular garrisons of the cities lying in this zone, according to the extent of the requirements for the maintenance of order and of public tranquillity.

Given at Frankfurt, 10th May, 1871.

v. Bismarck.
Arnim.

Jules Favre.
Pouyer-Quertier.
E. de Goulard.

23. Russia's reasons for war with Turkey, 1877.

Hertslet: IV., p 2598.

[Manifesto of the Emperor of Russia to his people, announcing war with Turkey. St. Petersburg, 24 April, 1877. This, unlike most manifestos of the kind, is a notoriously accurate statement of the European case against Turkey.]

We, Alexander II., by the Grace of God Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias, etc., make known :—

Our faithful and beloved subjects knew the lively interest which

we have always devoted to the destinies of the oppressed Christian population of Turkey. Our desire to ameliorate and guarantee their condition has been shared by the whole of the Russian nation, which shows itself ready to-day to make fresh sacrifices to relieve the condition of the Christians in the Balkan Peninsula. The life and property of our faithful subjects have always been dear to us. Our whole reign testifies to our constant anxiety to preserve to Russia the benefits of peace. This anxiety did not cease to animate us at the time of the sad events which came to pass in Herzegovina, Bosnia, and Bulgaria. We made it pre-eminently our object to attain the amelioration of the condition of Christians in the East by means of peaceful negotiations and concerted action with the great European Powers, our allies and friends. During two years we have made incessant efforts to induce the Porte to adopt such reforms as would protect the Christians of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Bulgaria from the arbitrary rule of the local authorities. The execution of these reforms followed, as a direct obligation, from the anterior engagements solemnly contracted by the Porte in the sight of all Europe. Our efforts, though supported by the joint diplomatic representations of the other Governments, have not attained the desired end. The Porte has remained immovable in its categorical refusal of every effectual guarantee for the security of its Christian subjects, and it rejected the demands of the Conference of Constantinople. Wishing to try all possible means of conciliation in order to persuade the Porte, we proposed to the other Cabinets to draw up a special Protocol, comprising the most essential conditions of the Conference of Constantinople, and to invite the Turkish Government to join this international action which traces the extreme limits of our peaceable demands. But our expectation was not realized. The Porte has not deferred to this unanimous wish of Christian Europe, and has not complied with the demands of the Protocol. Having exhausted our peaceful efforts, we are obliged by the haughty obstinacy of the Porte to proceed to more determined action. The sentiment of equity and that of our own dignity renders it imperative. Turkey, by its refusal, places us under the necessity of having recourse to arms. Deeply convinced of the justice of our cause, and relying in all humility upon the grace and assistance of the Most High, we make known to our faithful subjects that the moment foreseen by us when we pronounced these words, to which the whole of Russia answered with such unanimity, has actually arrived. We expressed our intention of acting independently should we deem it necessary and should the honour of Russia require it. To-day, in invoking the blessing of God upon our valiant armies, we give them the order to cross the frontier of Turkey.

Given at Kischeneff, the $\frac{1}{2}$ $\frac{1}{4}$ April, 1877.

ALEXANDER.

24. The Russo-Turkish War, 1877.

Annual Register, 1877.

[The revolt of Bosnia-Herzegovina against the Turks in 1875 had been followed by wholesale massacres of Bulgarians (the 'Bulgarian atrocities') by the Turks in May, 1876, and the rising of Servia, backed by Montenegro, against Turkey in June, 1876. Finally Russia declared war on Turkey, 24 April, 1877.]

Address of the Nobility of the Province of Moscow to the Czar, May, 1877.

"Most Gracious Czar,—With prayers in her heart and on her lips, the Russian nation arises at your bidding, in the name of Christ, to accomplish a great and just object. The time has come for the nobility to show themselves worthy of the station they occupy. True to the example of their ancestors, our sons and brothers are arrayed in the ranks of your gallant army. Not all of us can share the glorious distinction of fighting in the foremost ranks with the hereditary enemy of this country for the liberation of our enslaved brethren. But we have all to fulfil another important though more pacific duty—to serve the sick and wounded in a spirit of brotherly love to the best of our ability. May God assist you, beloved Czar, in this grand and holy struggle."

Address of the City of Moscow to the Czar, May, 1877.

"Most Gracious Czar,—Thou hast summoned us to the fight, and all Russia utters shouts of joy. Having marshalled thy troops to the battle, thou comest to us and showest thyself to the people in the walls of this ancient capital. The air resounds with acclamations of gratitude and blessing. Never has thy humble people greeted thee with such emotion and thankfulness as now, when listening to thy martial behest. This is an important and sacred hour. After thou hast spoken, O Czar, the honour and the conscience of Russia breathe freely. Thy people are aware that thou, O most pacific of Czars, dost not unsheathe the sword of Russia for the sake of vainglory, but in the name of Christ and for our much-suffering Slavonic brethren. Not to enslave and to destroy hurlest thou thy gallant regiments across the Danube, but to create liberty and prosperity, and to call to a new and promising existence tribes of the same race and faith with ourselves. There can be no more justifiable war than this. Praising God, who commands her to take up this noble and holy quarrel, Holy Russia prays that God may enable her to show herself worthy of her mission and to carry it out to the end, notwithstanding the intrigues of our enemies and the malicious whispers of self-sufficient wisdom. Pitying the victims of the war, and wishing to spare the Russian blood, so dear to thy heart, thou, O Czar, hast postponed the day of battle. The loving words thou hast spoken are a guarantee of our coming

success; Russian blood will not be shed in vain. The voice of Moscow is the voice of Russia. Faithful to thy Russia, O ruling Czar, rejoice in her sustained enthusiasm in the coming hours of trial. Cast about thee our love as an impenetrable coat of mail. The love of Russia is true and firm, and will work wonders.”

25. The Foundation of the Triple Alliance, 1879.

Annual Register, 1888.

[This Treaty, the work of Bismarck, was published officially by him in 1888. It became, by the inclusion of Italy on 20 May, 1882, the Triple Alliance.]

Whereas their Majesties the German Emperor, King of Prussia, and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, must regard it as their unavoidable duty as monarchs to take care under all circumstances of the safety of their realms and the quietude of their peoples, whereas, further, the two monarchs will be able, as in their former relation as members of the German Confederation, to perform this duty more easily and effectively by the firm co-operation of the two Empires; and whereas, finally, a cordial co-operation of Germany and Austria-Hungary can menace no one, but is calculated on the contrary to fortify the European peace created by the Treaty of Berlin, their Majesties the German Emperor and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, solemnly promise one another that they will never give to their purely defensive agreement an aggressive tendency in any direction, and have resolved to conclude an alliance of peace and mutual defence. To this end their Plenipotentiaries (duly accredited) have agreed as follows:—

Art. I.—Should, contrary to the hope and sincere wish of the two illustrious contracting parties, one of the two Empires be attacked by Russia, the illustrious contracting parties are bound to assist one another with the whole military power of their Empires, and, as a consequence of this, to conclude peace only in common and in agreement.

Art. II.—Should one of the illustrious contracting parties be attacked by another Power, the other august party hereby binds himself not only not to assist the aggressor against his august ally, but to observe at least an attitude of friendly neutrality towards the latter. If, however, in such a case the aggressor should be supported by Russia, either in the form of active co-operation only military measures threatening the party attacked, the obligation stipulated in Art. I. of this Treaty, to assist one another with full military strength, at once becomes binding, and the conduct of the war by the two august contracting parties then becomes common till a common conclusion of peace.

Art. III.—This Treaty shall, in accordance with its peaceful character, and in order to exclude every misinterpretation, be kept secret by both august contracting parties and communicated to a third Power only by consent of both, and in manner agreed upon by both. The two august contracting parties, in view of the sentiments expressed by the Emperor Alexander at the meeting in Alexandrovo, cherish the hope that the Russian military preparations will not really prove threatening to them, and have, therefore, no occasion at present to make any communication on the subject; but should this hope, contrary to expectation, prove erroneous, the two august contracting parties would regard it as a duty of honour to inform the Emperor Alexander, at least confidentially, that they must regard an attack on one of them as an attack on both.*

As witness whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty with their own hands, and attached their seals.

Done at Vienna, 7th of October, 1879.

HENRY VII., REUSS
ANDRASSY.

* *This communication was made.*

26. The Triple Alliance, 1882.

From Austrian White Paper, published
in *Vossische Zeitung*, 27 May, 1915.
Translated in *Times*, 1 June.

[The Triple Alliance was first formed in May, 1882, when Bismarck brought Italy into the Austro-German defensive alliance which he had formed in 1879. A further proof of the defensive character of the Alliance is afforded by the recent action of Italy. She refused to take part in the present war on the ground that it was a war of aggression by her Allies. In August, 1913, she had done the same, and had thus frustrated the projected Austrian attack on Serbia then. In 1914 she was not taken into the confidence of her Allies. "We were not consulted: we were told nothing," said the Italian Foreign Minister on 27 July to the French Ambassador at Rome (French Yellow Book No. 72). Further, Italy considered that Austria's action in 1914 prejudiced her interests in the Balkans, and that the Austrian offers of compensation were inadequate. On these three grounds, all relating to Clause VII., Italy declared the Alliance broken by Austria, and repudiated it on 4 May, 1915. She refused the further offers of Austria, and declared war on her on 23 May, with the avowed object of completing the work of liberating and uniting to Italy the Italian subjects of Austria. Austria has denounced her action as "a perfidy of which history knows not the like;" and it is to her that we owe the first authentic knowledge of the text of the Triple Alliance. She has published the clauses which, in her judgment, prove her case against Italy.]

PARTIAL TEXT.

Clause III.—In case one or two of the high contracting parties, without direct provocation on their part, should be attacked by one or more Great Powers not signatory of the present Treaty and should become involved in a war with them, the *casus foederis* would arise simultaneously for all the high contracting parties.

Clause IV.—In case a Great Power not signatory of the present Treaty should threaten the State security of one of the high contracting parties, and in case the threatened party should thereby be compelled to declare war against that Great Power, the two other contracting parties engage themselves to maintain benevolent neutrality towards their Ally. Each of them reserves its right, in this case, to take part in the war if it thinks fit in order to make common cause with its Ally.

Clause VII.—Austria-Hungary and Italy, who have solely in view the maintenance, as far as possible, of the territorial *status quo* in the East, engage themselves to use their influence to prevent all territorial changes which might be disadvantageous to the one or the other of the Powers signatory of the present Treaty. To this end they will give reciprocally all information calculated to enlighten each other concerning their own intentions and those of other Powers. Should, however, the case arise that, in the course of events, the maintenance of the *status quo* in the territory of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic or the Aegean Seas becomes impossible, and that, either in consequence of the action of a third Power or for any other reason, Austria-Hungary or Italy should be obliged to change the *status quo* for their part by a temporary or permanent occupation, such occupation would only take place after previous agreement between the two Powers, which would have to be based upon the principle of a reciprocal compensation for all territorial or other advantages that either of them might acquire over and above the existing *status quo*, and would have to satisfy the interests and rightful claims of both parties.

27. The German Emperor's Telegram to President Kruger, 1896.

Text in *German Imperial Gazette*
translated in *Times*, Jan. 3, 1896.

[This telegram is a State document, as it was sent after a conference between the Emperor and his Ministers.]

“I express to you my sincere congratulations that, without appealing to the help of friendly Powers, you and your people have succeeded in repelling with your own forces the armed bands which had broken into your country, and in maintaining the independence of your country against foreign aggression.”

28. German Naval Policy, 1900.

Preamble to the Navy Bill of 1900.

From German Text in proceedings of the Reichstag
I Session 1898-1900. *Fünfter Anlageband.*

[The German Government on 25 Jan., 1900, brought in a new Navy Bill, proposing great additions to the forces raised under the Navy Law of 1898. In the preamble to the Bill they present their official case. The Bill became Law on 14 June, 1900.]

For the German Empire of to-day the securing of its economic development, and particularly of its world trade, is a vital question.

For this end the German Empire requires not only peace on land, but also peace at sea—not, however, a peace at any price, but a peace with honour, which takes its legitimate needs into account. A war at sea for economic interests, especially trade interests, will presumably be of somewhat long duration, for the objects of a superior adversary will be the more completely attained the longer the war lasts. Further, a war at sea, which, after the destruction or investment of the naval forces of Germany, is confined to the blockade of her coasts and the sweeping of her merchant ships off the seas of the world, costs her adversary less; on the contrary, it amply covers the cost of the war to him by the simultaneous expansion of his own trade.

An unsuccessful war at sea, of even only one year's duration, would destroy Germany's maritime commerce, and then would thus bring about the most fatal conditions economically and (as a direct result of that) socially also.

Quite apart from the consequences of the possible terms of peace, a destruction of our maritime commerce during the war could not be made good in the near future, even after the end of the war, and thus the sacrifices of the war would be increased by a severe economic depression.

In order, under existing conditions, to protect Germany's maritime commerce and colonies, there is only one way: Germany must possess so strong a battlefleet, that a war with her involves, even for the most powerful naval adversary, the danger of risking his own position as a Power. For this object it is not absolutely necessary for the German battlefleet to be just as strong as that of the greatest naval Power, for a great naval Power would not as a rule be in a position to concentrate all its fighting forces against us. Even if it did succeed in meeting us with a much superior force, the defeat of a strong German fleet would nevertheless weaken our adversary so materially that in spite of any hard won victory his own position as a Power would thereafter cease to be secured by an adequate fleet. . . .

Apart from the increase of the home battlefleet, an increase of our ships in foreign waters is also required. Requiring, as we do, that our foreign fleet should be in a position (1) to represent German interests powerfully everywhere, (2) to be equal to warlike encounters with oversea States without navies worth mentioning, it is clear that at least an increase of five large and five small cruisers is needed, with the addition of one large and two small cruisers as a reserve”

The German Navy Law, 1900.

Reichsgesetzblatt, 1900. Nr. 21.

We *William* by the Grace of God German Emperor, King of Prussia, etc., decree in the name of the Empire, and in accordance with the assent of the Federal Council and Diet of the Empire, as follows :—

I. NAVAL EFFECTIVE LIST :

§ 1.

1. The effective list of the battlefleet shall comprise :

- 2 flagships.
- 4 squadrons each of 8 ships of the line.
- 8 large cruisers } as scouts.
- 24 small cruisers }

2. That of the fleet in foreign waters :

- 3 large cruisers.
- 10 small cruisers.

3. That of the reserve :

- 4 ships of the line.
- 3 large cruisers.
- 4 small cruisers.

By permission of this law the ships specified in the appendix are made chargeable on this provided list.

§ 2.

Ships withdrawn from the list by reason of wear and tear shall be replaced by substitution :

- Ships of the line after 25 years.
- Cruisers after 20 years.

The fixed times run from the year of the sanction of the commencement of the construction of the original ship till the sanction of the commencement of the construction of the substitute ship. For the period from 1901 to 1917 the construction of the substitute ships shall be regulated by the scale of Appendix B.

[Clause II. deals with the apportionment of times of service between the squadrons; III. with the personnel; IV. with the cost; V. cancels the Navy Law of 1898.]

Authentic under Our exalted signature with the printed addition of the Imperial Seal.

Given at Castell Sonalburg at Homburg von der Höhe on 14 June, 1900.

WILLIAM.
PRINCE HOHENLOHE.

[Appendix A contains a list of the names of the ships thus provided for, amounting to 27 ships of the line, 12 large cruisers and 29 small cruisers.]

APPENDIX B.

Apportionment for the particular years of the construction of substitute ships to be proposed between the years 1901 and 1917 :

Year of Substitution.	Ships of the Line.	Large Cruisers.	Small Cruisers.
1901 -	.. 1	.. -
1902 -	.. 1	.. 1
1903 -	.. 1	.. 1
1904 -	.. -	.. 2
1905 -	.. -	.. 2
1906 2	.. -	.. 2
1907 2	.. -	.. 2
1908 2	.. -	.. 2
1909 2	.. -	.. 2
1910 1	.. 1	.. 2
1911 1	.. 1	.. 2
1912 1	.. 1	.. 2
1913 1	.. 1	.. 2
1914 1	.. 1	.. 2
1915 1	.. 1	.. 2
1916 1	.. 1	.. 2
1917 2	.. -	.. 1
	—	—	—
	17	.. 10	.. 29
	—	—	—

29. Speech of the German Emperor to his Troops embarking for China, at Bremerhaven, 27 July, 1900.

Report in *Bremen Weser Zeitung*,
Translated in *Times*, 30 July, 1900.

[This speech, in combination with certain facts of the present war, is the origin of the nickname "Huns" for the Germans.]

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given; no prisoners will be taken. Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel (Attila) gained a reputation in virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China that no Chinaman will ever again even dare to look askance at a German. . . . May the blessing of God attend your flags, and may this war have the blessed result that Christianity may make its way into China."

This last sentence was not quoted by the "Times" of 30 July. It occurs in the "Times" of 10 October, 1900, in its report of the trial of Herr Harden, editor of "Die Zukunft," for lèse-majesté on account of his comments on his quotations from the speech in "Die Zukunft" of 11 August.

30. The Hague Peace Conference of 1907.—Extracts from the Conventions.

British Parliamentary Papers, 1908.
[Cd. 4175.]

[On 24 August, 1898, the Emperor Nicholas II. of Russia proposed a Conference of the Powers to discuss the best means of promoting three objects: (1) The gradual establishment of universal peace through the substitution of arbitration for war. (2) The limitation of the ever-increasing burden of armaments. (3) The humanisation of war.

The First Peace Conference, representing twenty-six Powers, including all the present belligerents, sat at the Hague from 18 May to 29 July, 1899.

Its chief value, beyond the establishment of a voluntary Arbitration Court, was to prepare the way for the work of the much more important Second Peace Conference, which was proposed by the American President, and convoked by Holland on the invitation of the Czar. Forty-four Powers were represented at this "Parliament of Man," which sat from 15 June to 18 October, 1907, and greatly developed the work of the First Conference as regards arbitration and the humanisation of war. The limitation of armaments, as in 1899, was merely dealt with by pious resolutions.

The Conventions quoted below were signed by all the present belligerents. These International Laws depend, of course, on reciprocity; and the breach of any of them by a signatory Power absolves the injured parties from any obligation to observe the broken Laws towards the guilty Power.]

Prisoners of War.

Prisoners of war are in the power of the hostile Government, but not of the individuals or corps who capture them.

They must be humanely treated.

All their personal belongings, except arms, horses, and military papers, remain their property (p. 51).

Hostilities.

Art. XXII.—Belligerents have not got an unlimited right as to the choice of means of injuring the enemy.

Art. XXIII.—In addition to the prohibitions provided by special Conventions, it is particularly forbidden :—

(a) To employ poison or poisoned weapons ;

(b) To kill or wound by treachery individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army ;

(c) To kill or wound an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or no longer having means of defence, has surrendered at discretion ;

(d) To declare that no quarter will be given ;

(e) To employ arms, projectiles, or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering ;

(f) To make improper use of a flag of truce, of the national flag, or of the military insignia and uniform of the enemy, as well as of the distinctive signs of the Geneva Convention ;

(g) To destroy or seize enemy property, unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war ; (p. 55).

Art. XXV.—The attack or bombardment, by any means whatever, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden (p. 56).

Art. XXVIII.—The giving over to pillage of a town or place even when taken by assault is forbidden (p. 56).

The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers.

Art. I.—The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable.

Art. II.—Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys, whether of munitions of war or of supplies, across the territory of a neutral Power.

[Art. III. forbids belligerents to erect wireless telegraphy stations on the territory of a neutral Power.

Art. IV. forbids recruiting by belligerents there].

Art. V.—A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Art. II. to IV. to occur on its territory. It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of neutrality unless such acts have been committed on its own territory.

Art. VII.—A neutral Power is not bound to prevent the export or transit, for either belligerent, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which could be of use to an army or fleet.

Art. X.—The fact of a neutral Power resisting even by force attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act (pp. 63-64).

Automatic Submarine Contact Mines.

Art. I.—It is forbidden :—

1. To lay unanchored automatic contact mines, unless they be so constructed as to become harmless one hour at most after the person who laid them has ceased to control them.

2. To lay anchored automatic contact mines which do not become harmless as soon as they have broken loose from their moorings.

3. To use torpedoes which do not become harmless when they have missed their mark (p. 78).

Bombardments by Naval Forces in time of War.

Art. I.—The bombardment by naval forces of undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings is forbidden (p. 83).

31. German Plans in 1913.

French Yellow Book, No. 2.

[Despatch from the French Minister of War, to M. Jonnart,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.]

PARIS, *April 2, 1913.*

I have just received from a reliable source an official secret report concerning the strengthening of the German army. The report is divided into two parts; the first consisting of general statements, the second dealing with technicalities and describing in the greatest detail, for each branch of the service, the measures to be adopted. Especially striking are the instructions with regard to the employment of motor-traction and the utilisation of aircraft.

I have the honour to enclose a copy of the first part of this document, which seems to merit your attention.

ÉTIENNE.

ENCLOSURE.

Memorandum on the strengthening of the German Army.

BERLIN, March 19, 1913.

I. GENERAL MEMORANDUM ON THE NEW MILITARY LAWS.

The increase has taken place in three stages :—

(1) The Conference of Algeciras has removed the last doubt with regard to the existence of an *Entente* between France, England and Russia. Moreover, we have seen that Austria-Hungary was obliged to keep some of her forces mobilised against Servia and Italy; finally, our fleet was not at that time sufficiently strong. At the end of the dispute the first matter taken in hand was the strengthening of our coast defences and the increase of our naval forces. To meet the English plan of sending an Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men to the Continent, it would be necessary to make a better formation of reserves to be used according to circumstances in the protection of the Coast, in fortresses and in siege operations. It was already clear at that time that it would be absolutely necessary to make a great effort.

(2) The French having violated the Morocco Conventions brought on the incident of Agadir. At that time the progress made by the French army, the moral recovery of the nation, the technical advance in the realm of aviation and of machine guns rendered an attack on France less easy than in the previous period. Further, an attack by the English fleet had to be considered. This difficult situation opened our eyes to the necessity for an increase in the army. This increase was from this moment considered as a minimum.

(3) The war in the Balkans might have involved us in a war in support of our ally. The new situation in the south of Austria-Hungary lessened the value of the help which this ally could give us. On the other hand, France was strengthened by a new *loi des cadres*; it was accordingly necessary to anticipate the date of execution contemplated by the new military law.

Public opinion is being prepared for a new increase in the active army, which would ensure Germany an honourable peace and the possibility of properly ensuring her influence in the affairs of the world. The new army law and the supplementary law which should follow will enable her almost completely to attain this end.

Neither ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French chauvinists, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slavs will turn us from our aim of protecting and extending *Deutschtum* (German influence) all the world over.

The French may arm as much as they wish, they cannot in one day increase their population. The employment of an army of negroes in the theatre of European operations will remain for a long time a dream, and in any case be devoid of beauty.

II.—AIM AND OBLIGATIONS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY, OF OUR ARMY, AND OF THE SPECIAL ORGANISATIONS FOR ARMY PURPOSES.

Our new army law is only an extension of the military education of the German nation. Our ancestors of 1813 made greater sacrifices. It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword that has been put into our hands and to hold it ready for defence as well as for offence. *We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.* We must accustom them to think that an offensive war on our part is a necessity, in order to combat the provocations of our adversaries. We must act with prudence so as not to arouse suspicion, and to avoid the crises which might injure our economic existence. We must so manage matters that under the heavy weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak (*Losschlagen*) should be considered as a relief, because after it would come decades of peace and prosperity, as after 1870. We must prepare for war from the financial point of view; there is much to be done in this direction. We must not arouse the distrust of our financiers, but there are many things which cannot be concealed.

We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand, we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. It is a means of keeping the forces of the enemy engaged. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary that we should open up relations, by means of well-chosen organisations, with influential people in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco, in order to prepare the measures which would be necessary in the case of a European war. Of course, in case of war, we should openly recognise these secret allies; and on the conclusion of peace we should secure to them the advantages which they had gained. These aims are capable of realisation. The first attempt which was made some years ago opened up for us the desired relations. Unfortunately these relations were not sufficiently consolidated. Whether we like it or not, it will be necessary to resort to preparations of this kind, in order to bring a campaign rapidly to a conclusion.

Risings provoked in time of war by political agents need to be carefully prepared and by material means. They must break out simultaneously with the destruction of the means of communication;

they must have a controlling head to be found among the influential leaders, religious or political. The Egyptian School is particularly suited to this purpose ; more and more it serves as a bond between the intellectuals of the Mohammedan World.

However this may be, we must be strong in order to annihilate at one powerful swoop our enemies in the east and west. But in the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states shall be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralised ; this would probably be the case with Belgium and Holland, so as to prevent our enemy in the west from gaining territory which they could use as a base of operations against our flank. In the north we have nothing to fear from Denmark or Scandinavia, especially as in any event we shall provide for the concentration of a strong northern army, capable of replying to any menace from this direction. In the most unfavourable case, Denmark might be forced by England to abandon her neutrality ; but by this time the decision would already have been reached both on land and on sea. Our northern army, the strength of which could be largely increased by Dutch formations, would oppose a very active defence to any offensive measures from this quarter.

In the south, Switzerland forms an extremely solid bulwark, and we can rely on her energetically defending her neutrality against France, and thus protecting our flank.

As was stated above, the situation with regard to the small states on our north-western frontier cannot be viewed in quite the same light. This will be a vital question for us, and our aim must be to take the offensive with a large superiority from the first days. For this purpose it will be necessary to concentrate a large army, followed up by strong Landwehr formations, which will induce the small states to follow us or at least to remain inactive in the theatre of operations, and which would crush them in the event of armed resistance. If we could induce these states to organise their system of fortification in such a manner as to constitute an effective protection for our flank we could abandon the proposed invasion. But for this, army reorganisation, particularly in Belgium, would be necessary in order that it might really guarantee an effective resistance. If, on the contrary, their defensive organisation was established against us, thus giving definite advantages to our adversary in the west, we could in no circumstances offer Belgium a guarantee for the security of her neutrality. Accordingly, a vast field is open to our diplomacy to work in this country on the lines of our interests.

The arrangements made with this end in view allow us to hope that it will be possible to take the offensive immediately after the complete concentration of the army of the Lower Rhine. An ultimatum with a short time-limit, to be followed immediately by invasion, would allow a sufficient justification for our action in international law.

Such are the duties which devolve on our army and which demand a striking force of considerable numbers. If the enemy attacks us, or if we wish to overcome him, we will act as our brothers did a hundred years ago; the eagle thus provoked will soar in his flight, will seize the enemy in his steel claws and render him harmless. We will then remember that the provinces of the ancient German Empire, the County of Burgundy and a large part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French; that thousands of brother Germans in the Baltic provinces are groaning under the Slav yoke. It is a national question of restoring to Germany her former possessions.

32. The Serbian point of view, 7 July, 1914.

Serbian Blue Book, No. 17.

[Despatch of the Serbian Minister of Vienna to his Government. The Archduke had been murdered on 28 June.]

For them one thing is obvious, whether it is proved or not that the outrage has been inspired and prepared at Belgrade, they must sooner or later solve the question of the so-called Great Serbian agitation within the Hapsburg Monarchy. In what manner they will do this and what means they will employ to that end has not as yet been decided; this is being discussed especially in high Catholic and military circles. . . . In this respect, Austria-Hungary has to choose one of the following courses: either to regard the Serajevo outrage as a national misfortune and a crime which ought to be dealt with in accordance with the evidence obtained, in which case Serbia's co-operation in the work will be requested in order to prevent the perpetrators escaping the extreme penalty; or, to treat the Serajevo outrage as a Pan-Serbian, South-Slav and Pan-Slav conspiracy with every manifestation of the hatred, hitherto repressed, against Slavdom. There are many indications that influential circles are being urged to adopt the latter course; it is, therefore, advisable to be ready for defence. Should the former and wiser course be adopted, we should do all we can to meet Austrian wishes in this respect.

33. The Austrian point of view, 25 July, 1914.

Austro-Hungarian Red Book, No. 26.

[Despatch from the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister to the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Petrograd. The situation resembles that of the spring of 1909, except that in 1914 Russia did not yield.]

Vienna, 25 July, 1914.

We were, of course, aware, when we decided to take serious measures against Serbia, of the possibility that the Servian dispute might develop into a collision with Russia. We could not, however, allow ourselves to be diverted by this eventuality from the position we took up towards Serbia, because fundamental considerations of national policy brought us face to face with the necessity of putting an end to the state of affairs in which a Russian charter made it possible for Serbia to threaten the Monarchy continuously without punishment and without the possibility of punishment.

Should events prove that Russia considered the moment for the great settlement with the central European Powers to have already arrived, and was therefore determined on war from the beginning, the following instructions to your Excellency appear indeed superfluous.

It might, however, be conceivable that Russia, in the event of the refusal of our demands by Serbia, and in face of the resulting necessity for us of military measures, might think better of it, and might even be willing not to allow herself to be swept away by the bellicose elements. . . .

I assume, generally, that your Excellency in the existing circumstances, has established a close understanding with your German colleague, who will certainly have been enjoined by his Government to leave the Russian Government no room for doubt that Austria-Hungary, in the event of a conflict with Russia, would not stand alone.

* * * * *

Any further toleration of Servian intrigues would undermine our existence as a State and our position as a great Power, thus also threatening the balance of power in Europe. We are, however, convinced that it is to Russia's own interests, as her peaceful leaders will clearly see, that the existing European balance of power which is of such importance for the peace of the world, should be maintained. Our action against Serbia, whatever form it takes, is conservative from first to last, and its object is the necessary preservation of our position in Europe.

34. The German bid for British Neutrality.

British Blue Book, No. 85.†

[The British Ambassador at Berlin to Sir Edward Grey,
British Foreign Secretary.]

Berlin, July 29, 1914.

I was asked to call upon the Chancellor to-night. His Excellency had just returned from Potsdam.

He said that should Austria be attacked by Russia a European conflagration might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to Germany's obligations as Austria's ally, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for British neutrality. He said that it was clear, so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy, that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that neutrality of Great Britain were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

I questioned his Excellency about the French colonies, and he said that he was unable to give a similar undertaking in that respect. As regards Holland, however, his Excellency said that so long as Germany's adversaries respected the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands, Germany was ready to give His Majesty's Government an assurance that she would do likewise. It depended upon the action of France what operations Germany might be forced to enter upon in Belgium, but when the war was over, Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.

His Excellency ended by saying that ever since he had been Chancellor the object of his policy had been, as you were aware, to bring about an understanding with England; he trusted that these assurances might form the basis of that understanding which he so much desired. He had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany, though it was, of course, at the present moment, too early to discuss details, and an assurance of British neutrality in the conflict which present crisis might possibly produce, would enable him to look forward to realisation of his desire.

In reply to his Excellency's enquiry how I thought his request would appeal to you, I said that I did not think it probable that at this stage of events you would care to bind yourself to any course of action and that I was of opinion that you would desire to retain full liberty.

E. GOSCHEN.

† The '*British Blue Book*' is also known by two other official titles, viz., the '*British White Paper*' and the '*British Diplomatic Correspondence*.' The '*Books*' of the various countries, except the Italian '*Green Book*,' have been officially issued in English as *Collected Diplomatic Documents relating to the Outbreak of the European War*. There is a very good brief preface, from which some points in this book are derived.

35. The British Reply.

British Blue Book, No. 101.

[Sir Edward Grey to British Ambassador at Berlin.]

Foreign Office, July 30, 1914.

His Majesty Government cannot for a moment entertain the Chancellor's proposal that they should bind themselves to neutrality on such terms.

What he asks us in effect is to engage to stand by while French colonies are taken and France is beaten so long as Germany does not take French territory as distinct from the colonies.

From the material point of view, such a proposal is unacceptable, for France, without further territory in Europe being taken from her, could be so crushed as to lose her position as a Great Power, and become subordinate to German policy.

Altogether apart from that, it would be a disgrace for us to make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France, a disgrace from which the good name of this country would never recover.

The Chancellor also in effect asks us to bargain away whatever obligation or interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either.

Having said so much it is unnecessary to examine whether the prospect of a future general neutrality agreement between England and Germany offered positive advantages sufficient to compensate us for tying our hands now. We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require in any such unfavourable and regrettable development of the present crisis as the Chancellor contemplates.

You should speak to the Chancellor in the above sense, and add most earnestly that the one way of maintaining the good relations between England and Germany is that they should continue to work together to preserve the peace of Europe; if we succeed in this object, the mutual relations of Germany and England will, I believe, be *ipso facto* improved and strengthened. For that object His Majesty's Government will work in that way with all sincerity and goodwill.

And I will say this: * If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia and

* *The offer that closes the British reply is very noteworthy. It was the best chance of an honourable and satisfactory peace. Its acceptance would have paved the way for the realisation of the ideals of the Hague Court, and perhaps in time of a federation of Europe. By the rejection of this offer, as well as by her other acts, Germany and her aims must be judged.*

ourselves, jointly or separately. I have desired this and worked for it, as far as I could, through the last Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a corresponding object, our relations sensibly improved. The idea has hitherto been too Utopian to form the subject of definite proposals, but if this present crisis, so much more acute than any that Europe has gone through for generations, be safely passed, I am hopeful that the relief and reaction which will follow may make possible some more definite rapprochement between the Powers than has been possible hitherto.

E. GREY.

36. Germany declares War on Russia, 1 Aug., 1914.

Russian Orange Book, No. 76.

[Note presented by the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg.]

July 19 (August 1), 7.10 p.m.

The Imperial German Government have used every effort since the beginning of the crisis to bring about a peaceful settlement. In compliance with a wish expressed to him by His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, the German Emperor had undertaken, in concert with Great Britain, the part of mediator between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg; but Russia, without waiting for any result, proceeded to a general mobilisation of her forces both on land and sea. In consequence of this threatening step, which was not justified by any military proceedings on the part of Germany, the German Empire was faced by a grave and imminent danger. If the German Government had failed to guard against this peril, they would have compromised the safety and the very existence of Germany. The German Government were, therefore, obliged to make representations to the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias and to insist upon a cessation of the aforesaid military acts. Russia having refused to comply with (not having considered it necessary to answer*) this demand, and having shown by this refusal (this attitude*) that her action was directed against Germany, I have the honour, on the instructions of my Government, to inform your Excellency as follows:—

His Majesty the Emperor, my august Sovereign, in the name of the German Empire, accepts the challenge, and considers himself at war with Russia.

F. POURTALES.

* *The words in brackets occur in the original. It must be supposed that two variations had been prepared in advance, and that, by mistake, they were both inserted in the Note. (Footnote by the Russian Foreign Office.)*

The German official version of the French original of the Note takes the non-bracketed text. (German White Book, Exhibit 26.)

37. Luxemburg protests against the violation of her Neutrality by Germany, 2 Aug., 1914.

British Blue Book, No. 147.

[In 1870 the Germans insisted on the strict observance of the neutrality of Luxemburg, which had been violated in minor ways by France, and by the natives in favour of France. In 1914 the Germans violated it, without warning. The Luxemburg Government offered no armed resistance—its famous fortress had been dismantled by the terms of the Neutrality Treaty of 1867, and its Regular Army was small, consisting of 150 men. It addressed the following protest to the Powers that guaranteed its neutrality, of whom Prussia was one. As the guarantee was collective, no Power took individual action in the matter.]

Luxemburg, August 2, 1914.

I have the honour to bring to your Excellency's notice the following facts :—

On Sunday, the 2nd August, very early, the German troops, according to the information which has up to now reached the Grand Ducal Government, penetrated into Luxemburg territory by the bridges of Wasserbillig and Remich, and proceeded particularly towards the south and in the direction of Luxemburg, the capital of the Grand Duchy. A certain number of armoured trains with troops and ammunition have been sent along the railway line from Wasserbillig to Luxemburg, where their arrival is expected. These occurrences constitute acts which are manifestly contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as guaranteed by the Treaty of London of 1867. The Luxemburg Government have not failed to address an energetic protest against this aggression to the representatives of His Majesty the German Emperor at Luxemburg. An identical protest will be sent by telegraph to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs at Berlin.

38. Belgium defends her duties and rights.

Belgian Grey Book, No. 22.

[On 31 July Great Britain, as in 1870, inquired simultaneously of France and Germany if they were prepared to respect the neutrality of Belgium, so long as it was violated by no other Power. Both replied on 31 July, France in the affirmative, Germany evasively.* Germany, however, reassured Belgium on the point, definitely, on 31 July, and again on 2 August, in a slightly ambiguous form.† Later, on 2 August, Germany presented an ultimatum to Belgium, to which Belgium replied as follows :—]

[Note communicated by M. Davignon, Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs, to Herr von Below Saleske, German Minister in Brussels.]

* *British Blue Book Nos. 114, 122, 125.*

† *Belgian Grey Book Nos. 11, 19.*

BRUSSELS,

August 3, 1914 (7 a.m.).

The German Government stated in their note of the 2nd August, 1914, that according to reliable information French forces intended to march on the Meuse, via Givet and Namur, and that Belgium, in spite of the best intentions, would not be in a position to repulse, without assistance, an advance of French troops.

The German Government, therefore, consider themselves compelled to anticipate this attack and to violate Belgian territory. In these circumstances, Germany proposed to the Belgian Government to adopt a friendly attitude towards her, and undertook, on the conclusion of peace, to guarantee the integrity of the Kingdom and its possessions to their full extent. The note added that if Belgium put difficulties in the way of the advance of German troops, Germany would be compelled to consider her as an enemy, and to leave the ultimate adjustment of the relations between the two States to the decision of arms.

This note has made a deep and painful impression upon the Belgian Government.

The intentions attributed to France by Germany are in contradiction to the formal declarations made to us on August 1, in the name of the French Government.

Moreover, if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader.

The treaties of 1839, confirmed by the treaties of 1870, vouch for the independence and neutrality of Belgium under the guarantee of the Powers, and notably of the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia.

Belgium has always been faithful to her international obligations, she has carried out her duties in a spirit of loyal impartiality, and she has left nothing undone to maintain and enforce respect for her neutrality.

The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law.

The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe.

Conscious of the part which Belgium has played for more than eighty years in the civilisation of the world, they refuse to believe that the independence of Belgium can only be preserved at the price of the violation of her neutrality.

If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.

DAVIGNON.

39. The British Ultimatum to Germany, 4 Aug., 1914.

British Blue Book, Nos. 153, 159.

The First Despatch.

[Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador at Berlin.]

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

The King of the Belgians has made an appeal to His Majesty the King for diplomatic intervention on behalf of Belgium in the following terms :—

“Remembering the numerous proofs of your Majesty’s friendship and that of your predecessor, and the friendly attitude of England in 1870 and the proof of friendship you have just given us again, I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty’s Government to safeguard the integrity of Belgium.”*

His Majesty’s Government are also informed that the German Government have delivered to the Belgian Government a note proposing friendly neutrality entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening in case of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy. An answer was requested within twelve hours.*

We also understand that Belgium has categorically refused this as a flagrant violation of the law of nations.

His Majesty’s Government are bound to protest against this violation of a treaty to which Germany is a party in common with themselves, and must request an assurance that the demand made upon Belgium will not be proceeded with and that her neutrality will be respected by Germany. You should ask for an immediate reply.

E. GREY.

* *Belgian Grey Book Nos. 20, 25.*

The Second Despatch.

We hear that Germany has addressed note to Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs stating that German Government will be compelled to carry out, if necessary, by force of arms, the measures considered indispensable.

We are also informed that Belgian territory has been violated at Gemmenich.

In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request, and ask that a satisfactory reply to it and to my telegram of this morning be received here by 12 o'clock to-night. If not, you are instructed to ask for your passports, and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.

E. GREY.

40. The British Declaration of War on Germany.

British Blue Book, No. 160.

Final interviews of the British Ambassador with the German Foreign Secretary and Chancellor on the evening of 4 August, 1914.

[Sir E. Goschen, British Ambassador in Berlin, to Sir Edward Grey.]

LONDON, August 8, 1914.

Sir,

In accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram of the 4th instant*, I called upon the Secretary of State that afternoon and enquired, in the name of His Majesty's Government, whether the Imperial Government would refrain from violating Belgian neutrality. Herr von Jagow† at once replied that he was sorry to say that his answer must be "No," as, in consequence of the German troops having crossed the frontier that morning, Belgian neutrality had been already violated. Herr von Jagow again went into the reasons why the Imperial Government had been obliged to take this step, namely, that they had to advance into France by the quickest and easiest way, so as to be able to get well ahead with their operations and endeavour to strike some decisive blow as early as possible. It was a matter of life and death for them, as if they had gone by the more southern route they could not have hoped, in view of the paucity of roads and

* See No. 153.

† German Secretary of State.

the strength of the fortresses, to have got through without formidable opposition, entailing great loss of time. This loss of time would have meant time gained by the Russians for bringing up their troops to the German frontier. Rapidity of action was the great German asset, while that of Russia was an inexhaustible supply of troops. I pointed out to Herr von Jagow that this *fait accompli* of the violation of the Belgian frontier rendered, as he would readily understand, the situation exceedingly grave, and I asked him whether there was not still time to draw back and avoid possible consequences, which both he and I would deplore. He replied that, for the reasons he had given me, it was now impossible for them to draw back.

During the afternoon I received your further telegram of the same date, † and, in compliance with the instructions therein contained, I again proceeded to the Imperial Foreign Office and informed the Secretary of State that unless the Imperial Government could give the assurance by 12 o'clock that night that they would proceed no further with their violation of the Belgian frontier and stop their advance, I had been instructed to demand my passports and inform the Imperial Government that His Majesty's Government would have to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty to which Germany was as much a party as themselves.

Herr von Jagow replied that to his great regret he could give no other answer than that which he had given me earlier in the day, namely, that the safety of the Empire rendered it absolutely necessary that the Imperial troops should advance through Belgium. I gave his Excellency a written summary of your telegram, and, pointing out that you had mentioned 12 o'clock as the time when His Majesty's Government would expect an answer, asked him whether, in view of the terrible consequences which would necessarily ensue, it were not possible even at the last moment that their answer should be reconsidered. He replied that if the time given were even twenty-four hours or more, his answer must be the same. I said that in that case I should have to demand my passports. This interview took place at about 7 o'clock. In a short conversation which ensued Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France. I said that this sudden end to my work in Berlin was to me also a matter of deep regret and disappointment, but that he must understand that under the circumstances and in view of our engagements, His

† See No. 159.

Majesty's Government could not possibly have acted otherwise than they had done.

I then said that I should like to go and see the Chancellor, as it might be, perhaps, the last time I should have an opportunity of seeing him. He begged me to do so. I found the Chancellor very agitated. His Excellency at once began a harangue, which lasted for about twenty minutes. He said that the step taken by His Majesty's Government was terrible to a degree; just for a word—"neutrality," a word which in war time had so often been disregarded—just for a scrap of paper Great Britain was going to make war on a kindred nation who desired nothing better than to be friends with her. All his efforts in that direction had been rendered useless by this last terrible step, and the policy to which, as I knew, he had devoted himself since his accession to office had tumbled down like a house of cards. What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for his life against two assailants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen. I protested strongly against that statement, and said that, in the same way as he and Herr von Jagow wished me to understand that for strategical reasons it was a matter of life and death to Germany to advance through Belgium and violate the latter's neutrality, so I would wish him to understand that it was, so to speak, a matter of "life and death" for the honour of Great Britain that she should keep her solemn engagement to do her utmost to defend Belgium's neutrality if attacked. That solemn compact simply had to be kept, or what confidence could anyone have in engagements given by Great Britain in the future? The Chancellor said, "But at what price will that compact have been kept. Has the British Government thought of that?" I hinted to his Excellency as plainly as I could that fear of consequences could hardly be regarded as an excuse for breaking solemn engagements, but his Excellency was so excited, so evidently overcome by the news of our action, and so little disposed to hear reason that I refrained from adding fuel to the flame by further argument. . . .

41. The German Defence.

The German Chancellor's Speech in the Reichstag.

August 4, 1914.

German Official Parliamentary Report.

Meine Herren, wir sind jetzt in der Notwehr (lebhaftes Zustimmung) und Not kennt kein

"Gentlemen, this is now for us a case of just self-defence in a time of extreme necessity—

Gebot! (Stürmischer Beifall.) Unsere Truppen haben Luxemburg besetzt — (Bravo) — vielleicht schon belgisches Gebiet betreten. (Erneutes Bravo.) Meine Herren, das widerspricht den Geboten des Völkerrechts. Die französische Regierung hat zwar in Brüssel erklärt, die Neutralität Belgiens respektieren zu wollen, solange der Gegner sie respektiere. Wir wussten aber, dass Frankreich zum Einfall bereit stand. (Hört! hört! rechts.) Frankreich konnte warten, wir aber nicht! Ein französischer Einfall in unsere Flanke am unteren Rhein hätte verhängnisvoll werden können. (Lebhafte Zustimmung.) So waren wir gezwungen, uns über den berechtigten Protest der luxemburgischen und der belgischen Regierung hinwegzusetzen. (Sehr richtig.) Das Unrecht — Ich spreche offen — das Unrecht, das wir damit tun, werden wir wieder gutzumachen suchen, sobald unser militärisches Ziel erreicht ist. (Bravo.) Wer so bedroht ist wie wir und um sein Höchstes kämpft, der darf nur daran denken, wie er sich durchhaut! (Anhaltender brausender Beifall und Händeklatschen im ganzen Hause und auf den Tribünen.) . . . Ich wiederhole das Wort des Kaisers, mit reinem Gewissen zieht Deutschland in den Kampf. . . .

(Vigorous assent) — and necessity knows no law.* (Stormy applause.) Our troops have occupied Luxemburg — (Cheers) have perhaps† already set foot on Belgian territory. (Renewed cheers.) Gentlemen, that is against international law. It is true that the French Government have declared in Brussels their intention of respecting the neutrality of Belgium, as long as their adversary respects it. We knew, however, that France stood prepared for the invasion. (Hear, hear, on the Right.) France could wait, but we could not. A French invasion directed against our flank on the lower Rhine might have been fatal. (Vigorous assent.) So we were forced to disregard the legitimate protests of the Luxemburg and Belgian Governments. (“Quite right.”) The wrong — I speak openly — the wrong which we are thus doing, we will try to make good again, as soon as our military goal is reached. (Cheers.) Whoever is as threatened as we are, and is fighting for all he prizes most, can think only of how to cut his way through. (Continued tumultuous applause and clapping throughout the whole House and on the tribunes.) . . . I repeat the Emperor’s words, it is with a pure conscience that Germany marches to the fight. . . .”

* I have tried to bring out in this translation the full force of the argument which would be conveyed to the German mind by the Chancellor’s use of the word “Notwehr.” “Not” means “extreme need,” and “Notwehr” (self-defence, literally “need-defence”) is thus defined in German criminal law “defence against an unlawful attack made with naked weapons and involving danger to life, *necessaria defensio*.”

† The Germans had invaded Belgium that morning.

42. Was Belgium loyal to her obligations of Neutrality ?

[Undoubtedly, at the time of the European crisis in July, 1914, Belgium scrupulously observed her neutral obligations. On 31 July, Great Britain, in informing her of the British Note sent that day to enquire of France and Germany if they would keep the Treaty of 1839, added that she assumed that it would also be observed by Belgium herself. On 1 August Belgium replied that she would strictly observe it and believed she could do so unaided. These two promises Belgium embodied in a Note to all the five guaranteeing Powers—Germany, Austria, France, Great Britain and Russia. This Note was sent on 1 August. It had been prepared for despatch as early as July 24. On 2 August came the news of the violation by Germany of the neutrality of Luxemburg: and at 7 p.m. the German ultimatum to Belgium was presented. At its expiry at 7 a.m. on 3 August, Belgium rejected it, and notified the five Powers of the fact; but also stated that “as no act of war has occurred up to the present, the Cabinet has decided that there is for the moment no need to appeal to the guaranteeing Powers.” At noon she refused a French offer of armed help. In the evening of 3 August she appealed to England for diplomatic intervention. It was not till the German invasion of Belgium had actually taken place on 4 August that she appealed to Great Britain, France and Russia to co-operate in her defence. On 5 August these three Powers promised to do so. The simple recital of these facts disproves the German allegation of Belgium treachery to the Treaty of 1839, and hardly requires the further statement made by the Belgian Minister of War, that no British or French troops had entered Belgium before the outbreak of the War. But Germany also maintains that already in 1906 Belgium had betrayed her neutrality to France and Great Britain. In support of this charge Germany has published, after a search in the Belgian archives, four documents. The original of the last of these is given below. The charge is refuted by the British despatch to Belgium of 7 April, 1913, stating that Great Britain would in no case be the first to violate Belgian neutrality.* It is also refuted by the following extract from a brochure entitled *On the Violation of Belgian Neutrality*, by M. J. Van den Heuvel, Belgian Minister of State.]

*See *Collected Diplomatic Documents*, Preface p.p. xiv--xvi.

Confidential report from the files of the Belgian General Staff.

From facsimile publication in *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 Nov., 1914.
Quoted in *Belgian Grey Book*, No. 4, Appendix.

(Confidentielle.)

L'attaché militaire anglais a demandé à voir le Général Jungbluth. Ces messieurs se sont rencontrés le 23 avril.

Le Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges a dit au général que l'Angleterre disposait d'une armée pouvant être envoyée sur le continent, composée de six divisions d'infanterie et huit brigades de cavalerie, soit en tout 160,000 hommes. Elle a aussi tout ce qu'il lui faut pour défendre son territoire insulaire. Tout est prêt.

Le Gouvernement britannique, lors des derniers événements, aurait débarqué immédiatement chez nous, même si nous n'avions pas demandé de secours.

Le général a objecté qu'il faudrait pour cela notre consentement.

L'attaché militaire a répondu qu'il le savait, mais que comme nous n'étions pas à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer chez nous, l'Angleterre aurait débarqué ses troupes en Belgique en tout état de cause.

Quant au lieu de débarquement, l'attache militaire n'a pas précisé ; il a dit que la côte était assez longue ; mais le général sait que M. Bridges a fait, d'Ostende, des visites journalières à Zeebrugge pendant les fêtes de Pâques.

Le général a ajouté que nous étions, d'ailleurs, parfaitement à même d'empêcher les Allemands de passer.

Le 24 avril, 1912.

The Belgian Minister's refutation of the charges.

Appendix to Belgian Grey Book, No. 5.

An official communiqué appeared at once in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, of the 13th October. The whole German press hastened to echo the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. Large notices were posted on the walls in Brussels and innumerable little yellow notices made their appearance in the public places of other occupied towns. The discovery was of paramount importance ; it was bound to prove to all impartial people the guilt of the Governments both of England and of Belgium and to show the foresight and correctitude of Germany.

According to the communiqué, it appeared from documents found in Brussels that, at the request of Great Britain, at the beginning of the year 1906, Belgium had, in anticipation of the violation of her neutrality by Germany, concluded with the Powers of the Entente a convention which had for its object the defence of her territory. Although a marginal note on the *dossier* of 1906 stated expressly that "the entry of the English into Belgium would only take place after the violation of her neutrality by Germany," the suggestion was that Belgium, in settling the arrangements for this contingent entry, had seriously misunderstood the duties of neutrals. Germany alone was the object of her suspicion and she had not "also foreseen the violation of Belgian neutrality by France, and to provide for that event, concluded with Germany a convention analogous to that concluded with France and Great Britain."

The communiqué recognises that it was open to Belgium, in the interests of self-protection, to make arrangements with the Powers which had guaranteed her international position. Indeed a neutralised State retains the right of making defensive treaties. The fact that the inviolability of such a State is under the ægis or guarantee of certain Powers does not deprive her of this right. But the arrangements which such a State can make with the guaranteeing Powers to guard against a contingent invasion are, after all, nothing but measures for carrying out the pre-existing engagements of the guarantee.

The grievance alleged by the communiqué is that a convention should have been made by Belgium in anticipation of a penetration of hostile troops into Belgian territory, without notice being given to Germany, and without the latter Power being appealed to to make a similar convention in anticipation of an invasion of Belgium by French or British troops.

If a convention really existed, as the communiqué states, it is just to observe that a State which has prepared a plan of invasion is in an anomalous position in addressing reproaches to a State which limits its action to putting itself on guard and organising necessary measures of defence. And we must remember that the invasion of Belgium by Germany was, according to Herr von Jagow, forced upon the German General Staff by an event of long standing, namely, the Franco-Russian Alliance.

As a matter of fact the convention which forms the gravamen of the German charges never existed.

Belgium did not make any special arrangements in anticipation of the violation of her territory by Germany, either with England or with France, either in 1906 or at any other date. It is in vain that Germany has searched and will search our archives, she will not find there any proof of her allegation.

The official communiqué of the 13th October published three documents; the second communiqué of the 24th November added a fourth document to the *dossier*. None of these documents establishes the existence of any convention whatever.

The first document is a report made to the Minister of War on the 10th April, 1906, by General Ducarne, Chief of the Belgian General Staff. It relates to the conversations which took place at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, the British military attaché, between himself and General Ducarne, on the subject of

the arrangements that England might be disposed to make to assist Belgium in the event of a German invasion. According to the German notices :—

The Chief of the Belgian General Staff worked out a comprehensive plan for joint operations by a British Expeditionary Force of 100,000 men with the Belgian Army against Germany in repeated conferences with Lieutenant-Colonel Barnardiston, at the instigation of the latter. The plan was approved by the Chief of the British General Staff, Major-General Grierson. The Belgian General Staff were supplied with all data as to the strength and organisation of the British forces. The latter thoroughly prepared for the transport. Co-operation was carefully worked out in every detail. Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne were contemplated as the points of disembarkation for the British troops.

This document shows that though the Belgian General Staff did not take the initiative, yet it did not refuse to discuss with the British military attaché a plan for the help which Britain, acting as guaranteeing Power, would be able, in case of need, to send to Belgium to repulse a German attack.

But what accusation against Belgium can be based on this ?

Since it is recognised that Belgium has the right to make defensive agreements for putting into operation the guarantees given by the guaranteeing Powers, the Belgian General Staff would have found it difficult to refuse entirely to consider suggestions made by the military attachés of those Powers. Such discussions do not interfere in any way with the freedom or responsibility of the Government, and it is they alone who can decide whether it is expedient or opportune to enter into a convention, and, if so, what convention they should make, having regard to the duties and interests of the country.

In 1906 the Government believed that it was proper for them to rest content, as they had rested for more than sixty years, with the general guarantee embodied in the Treaty of 1839, and that the details of carrying out the guarantee could not be fixed beforehand, that in their very nature they must vary according to circumstances. Thus no convention was entered upon. The work of the British military attaché and the Belgian officers resulted in nothing but the submission of a report to the Minister of War by the Chief of the General Staff.

The second document is a military map. “A map showing the method of deployment of the French army was found in the secret *dossier*.”

The only inference to be drawn from this document—which is not connected in any way with the report already mentioned—is that the Belgian General Staff has always sought, as is the duty of all General Staffs, to obtain the most precise information possible as to the military plans of neighbouring Powers.

But to pretend to argue from the mere possession of this map that France must have been a party to the alleged convention, of which Britain and Belgium are wantonly accused, is to transcend the bounds of fancy.

The third document is a report on the international position of Belgium sent by Baron Greindl, Belgian Minister Plenipotentiary at Berlin, to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Brussels on the 23rd December, 1911.

Baron Greindl thought that a “French invasion was as probable as a German invasion.”

The combinations of the Entente Cordiale include, without doubt, the thought of an enveloping movement from the north. . . . The equally perfidious and naïf revelations of Colonel Barnardiston . . . showed us clearly what was intended. . . . This British army, landed at Calais and Dunkirk, would not march along our frontier to Longwy in order to reach Germany. It would immediately invade us from the north-west. . . .

I would strongly urge that a plan of action should be drawn up for this eventuality also.

The inference to be drawn from this document is that the plans of the Belgian General Staff communicated to Baron Greindl dealt with the contingency either of an entry into Belgium through the gap of the Meuse or of an invasion of Luxemburg by one or other of the belligerents. Baron Greindl thought it his duty to lay stress upon another hypothesis, namely, the danger of an enveloping movement by the north of France, which he had so often heard talked about in Berlin. But the whole of this report rebuts the accusation that Belgium had formed any engagements either with England or with France. Baron Greindl's attitude towards Barnardiston's suggestions proves conclusively that he knew that these suggestions had not resulted in any convention.

Such are the three documents published on the 13th October by the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* and placarded everywhere with such a flourish of trumpets. They do not contain the smallest scrap of evidence to support the German charge. No criticism adverse to Belgium can be based upon them. The German Government themselves understood this so well that they ordered fresh searches to be made in the archives.

The *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of 24th November gave us the result of this second search. It is a fourth document, reporting a conversation which took place between the British military attaché, Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges, and General Jungbluth. It bears date the 23rd April, 1912 :—

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the general that Great Britain had an army of 160,000 men. . . . The British Government at the time of the recent events would have immediately landed troops in Belgium even if we had not asked for help. The general protested that *our consent would be necessary for this*. The military attaché answered that he knew that, but, that as we were not in a position to prevent the Germans from passing through Belgium, Great Britain would have landed her troops in any event. As to the place of landing the military attaché was not explicit. . . . The general added that we were perfectly well able to prevent the Germans from going through.

The inference to be drawn from this document is that, in a private conversation between two officers of high rank, which had no reference to any official mission, the British officer expressed the personal opinion that in case of war Great Britain could land "immediately" troops in Belgium "even if we had not asked for help." The Belgian general at once protested. He insisted that "our consent" was necessary, and that there was all the less reason for dispensing with it since we "were perfectly well able" to stop the Germans; that is to say, to make them lose sufficient time to deprive them of the advantage of a sudden attack.

How is it possible to draw any inference unfavourable to Great Britain from the personal opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges when, from what has since happened, it is certain that the British Government did not intend to send, and did not in fact send, troops to Belgium, except upon a request from the Belgian Government put forward after the violation of her territory ?

How is it possible to draw an inference unfavourable to Belgium from this conversation ? General Jungbluth defended her freedom and her neutrality. And the very fact that the discussion took place, and the vagueness which remained as to the places of landing, both prove that Belgium was not bound by any convention determining the manner in which help should be furnished by England.

Germany ought then to cease to accuse the Belgian Government of having given themselves since 1906 into the hands of the Powers of the Triple Entente. The first three documents which the Germans have taken from the files of the General Staff, like the fourth which has been brought up to support them, far from establishing any improper action whatever on the part of the Belgian authorities, show clearly that they have always taken the

most scrupulous care to reconcile the precautions exacted by the necessity of safeguarding the independence and maintaining the honour of the country with the duties of the strictest neutrality.

The loyal attitude of Belgium and Great Britain is clearly shown by the action which preceded the German ultimatum.

When Belgium saw the storm-clouds gathering on the darkened horizon she wanted to accelerate her military re-organisation. She worked at it for years. In 1902 she strengthened her cadres. After two years of discussion in 1905 and 1906 she decided to finish the fortifications of the fortress of Antwerp and to raise her defensive organisation to a pitch commensurate with the offensive force then at the disposal of the armies of Europe. Then came the renewal of the artillery, then the introduction of *service personnelle*, finally the imposition of general liability to serve. These stages were arrived at with considerable difficulty because the nation, relying on treaties and determined herself to observe neutrality with the strictest impartiality, could not believe that in the twentieth century anyone could be cruel enough to think of violating the rights of a peaceful people.

In addition Belgium had faith in the energy and the valour of her army, and she counted on the help of her guarantors should need arise.

43. France speaks for herself and her Allies.

French Yellow Book, No. 159.

[Speech delivered by M. René Viviani, President of the Council, in the Chamber of Deputies, August 4, 1914.
(Journal Officiel, August 5, 1914.)]

GENTLEMEN,

The German Ambassador yesterday left Paris after notifying us of the existence of a state of war.

The Government owe to Parliament a true account of the events which in less than ten days have unloosed a European war and compelled France, peaceful and valiant, to defend her frontier against an attack, the hateful injustice of which is emphasised by its calculated unexpectedness.

This attack, which has no excuse, and which began before we were notified of any declaration of war, is the last act of a plan, whose origin and object I propose to declare before our own democracy and before the opinion of the civilised world.

As a consequence of the abominable crime which cost the Austro-Hungarian Heir-Apparent and the Duchess of Hohenburg their lives, difficulties arose between the Cabinets of Vienna and Belgrade.

The majority of the Powers were only semi-officially informed of these difficulties up till Friday, July 24th, the date on which the Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors communicated to them a circular which the press has published.

The object of this circular was to explain and justify an ultimatum delivered the evening before to Servia by the Austro-Hungarian Minister at Belgrade.

This ultimatum in alleging the complicity of numerous Servian subjects and associations in the Serajevo crime, hinted that the official Servian authorities themselves were no strangers to it. It demanded a reply from Servia by 6 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, July 25th.

The Austrian demands, or at any rate many of them, without doubt struck a blow at the rights of a sovereign State. Notwithstanding their excessive character, Servia, on July 25th, declared that she submitted to them almost without reserve.

This submission, which constituted a success for Austria-Hungary, a guarantee for the peace of Europe, was not unconnected with the advice tendered to Belgrade from the first moment by France, Russia and Great Britain.

The value of this advice was all the greater since the Austro-Hungarian demands had been concealed from the Chanceries of the Triple Entente, to whom in the three preceding weeks the Austro-Hungarian Government had on several occasions given an assurance that their claims would be extremely moderate.

It was, therefore, with natural astonishment that the Cabinets of Paris, St. Petersburg and London learned on 26th July that the Austrian Minister at Belgrade, after a few minutes' examination, declared that the Servian reply was unacceptable, and broke off diplomatic relations.

This astonishment was increased by the fact that on Friday, the 24th, the German Ambassador came and read to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs a *note verbale* asserting that the Austro-Servian dispute must remain localised, without intervention by the great Powers, or otherwise "incalculable consequences" were to be feared. A similar *démarche* was made on Saturday, the 25th, at London and at St. Petersburg.

Need I, Gentlemen, point out to you the contrast between the threatening expressions used by the German Ambassador at Paris and the conciliatory sentiments which the Powers of the Triple Entente had just manifested by the advice which they gave to Servia to submit ?

Nevertheless, in spite of the extraordinary character of the German *démarche*, we immediately, in agreement with our Allies and our friends, took a conciliatory course and invited Germany to join in it.

We have had from the first moment regretfully to recognise that our intentions and our efforts met with no response at Berlin.

Not only did Germany appear wholly unwilling to give to Austria-Hungary the friendly advice which her position gave her the right to offer, but from this moment and still more in the following days, she seemed to intervene between the Cabinet at Vienna and the compromises suggested by the other Powers.

On Tuesday, 28th July, Austria-Hungary declared war on Servia. This declaration of war, with its aggravation of the state of affairs brought about by the rupture of diplomatic relations three days before, gave ground for believing that there was a deliberate desire for war, and a systematic programme for the enslavement of Servia.

Thus there was now involved in the dispute not only the independence of a brave people, but the balance of power in the Balkans, embodied in the Treaty of Bukarest of 1913, and consecrated by the moral support of all the great Powers.

However, at the suggestion of the British Government with its constant and firm attachment to the maintenance of the peace of Europe, the negotiations were continued, or, to speak more accurately, the Powers of the Triple Entente tried to continue them.

From this common desire sprang the proposal for action by the four Powers, England, France, Germany and Italy, which was intended, by assuring to Austria all legitimate satisfaction, to bring about an equitable adjustment of the dispute.

On Wednesday, the 29th, the Russian Government, noting the persistent failure of these efforts and faced by the Austrian mobilisation and declaration of war, fearing the military destruction of Servia, decided as a precautionary measure to mobilise the troops of four military districts, that is to say, the formations echeloned along the Austro-Hungarian frontier exclusively.

In taking this step, the Russian Government were careful to inform the German Government that their measures, restricted as they were and without any offensive character towards Austria, were not in any degree directed against Germany.

In a conversation with the Russian Ambassador at Berlin, the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs acknowledged this without demur.

On the other hand, all the efforts made by Great Britain, with the adherence of Russia and the support of France, to bring Austria and Servia into touch under the moral patronage of Europe were encountered at Berlin with a predetermined negative of which the diplomatic despatches afford the clearest proof.

This was a disquieting situation which made it probable that there existed at Berlin intentions which had not been disclosed. Some hours afterwards this alarming suspicion was destined to become a certainty.

In fact Germany's negative attitude gave place thirty-six hours later to positive steps which were truly alarming. On the 31st July, Germany, by proclaiming "a state of danger of war," cut the communications between herself and the rest of Europe, and obtained for herself complete freedom to pursue against France in absolute secrecy military preparations which, as you have seen, nothing could justify.

Already for some days, and in circumstances difficult to explain, Germany had prepared for the transition of her army from a peace footing to a war footing.

From the morning of the 25th July, that is to say even before the expiration of the time limit given to Servia by Austria, she had confined to barracks the garrisons of Alsace-Lorraine. The same day she had placed the frontier-works in a complete state of defence. On the 26th, she had indicated to the railways the measures preparatory for concentration. On the 27th, she had completed requisitions and placed her covering troops in position. On the 28th, the summons of individual reservists had begun and units which were distant from the frontier had been brought up to it.

Could all these measures, pursued with implacable method, leave us in doubt of Germany's intentions ?

Such was the situation when, on the evening of the 31st July, the German Government, which, since the 24th, had not participated by any active step in the conciliatory efforts of the Triple Entente,

addressed an ultimatum to the Russian Government under the pretext that Russia had ordered a general mobilisation of her armies, and demanded that this mobilisation should be stopped within twelve hours.

This demand, which was all the more insulting in form because a few hours earlier the Emperor Nicholas II., with a movement at once confiding and spontaneous, had asked the German Emperor for his mediation, was put forward at a moment when, on the request of England and with the knowledge of Germany, the Russian Government was accepting a formula of such a nature as to lay the foundation for a friendly settlement of the Austro-Servian dispute and of the Austro-Russian difficulties by the simultaneous arrest of military operations and of military preparations.

The same day this unfriendly *démarche* towards Russia was supplemented by acts which were frankly hostile towards France; the rupture of communications by road, railway, telegraph and telephone, the seizure of French locomotives on their arrival at the frontier, the placing of machine guns in the middle of the permanent way which had been cut, and the concentration of troops on this frontier.

From this moment we were no longer justified in believing in the sincerity of the pacific declaration which the German representative continued to shower upon us. (Hear, hear.)

We knew that Germany was mobilising under the shelter of the "state of danger of war."

We learnt that six classes of reservists had been called up, and that transport was being collected even for those army corps which were stationed a considerable distance from the frontier.

As these events unfolded themselves, the Government, watchful and vigilant, took from day to day, and even from hour to hour, the measures of precaution which the situation required; the general mobilisation of our forces on land and sea was ordered.

The same evening, at 7.30, Germany, without waiting for the acceptance by the Cabinet of St. Petersburg of the English proposal, which I have already mentioned, declared war on Russia.

The next day, Sunday, the 2nd August, without regard for the extreme moderation of France, in contradiction to the peaceful declarations of the German Ambassador at Paris, and in defiance of the rules of international law, German troops crossed our frontier at three different points.

At the same time, in violation of the Treaty of 1867, which guaranteed with the signature of Prussia the neutrality of Luxemburg, they invaded the territory of the Grand Duchy and so gave cause for a protest by the Luxemburg Government.

Finally, the neutrality of Belgium also was threatened. The German Minister, on the evening of the 2nd August, presented to the Belgian Government an ultimatum requesting facilities in Belgium for military operations against France, under the lying pretext that Belgian neutrality was threatened by us ; the Belgian Government refused, and declared that they were resolved to defend with vigour their neutrality, which was respected by France and guaranteed by treaties, and in particular by the King of Prussia. (Unanimous and prolonged applause.)

Since then, Gentlemen, the German attacks have been renewed, multiplied, and accentuated. At more than fifteen points our frontier has been violated. Shots have been fired at our soldiers and Customs officers. Men have been killed and wounded. Yesterday a German military aviator dropped three bombs on Lunéville.

The German Ambassador, to whom as well as to all the great Powers, we communicated these facts, did not deny them or express his regrets for them. On the contrary, he came yesterday evening to ask me for his passports, and to notify us of the existence of a state of war, giving as his reason, in the teeth of all the facts, hostile acts committed by French aviators in German territory in the Eifel district, and even on the railway near Carlsruhe and near Nuremberg. This is the letter which he handed to me on the subject :—

“ M. Le Président,

“ The German administrative and military authorities have established a certain number of flagrantly hostile acts committed on German territory by French military aviators. Several of these have openly violated the neutrality of Belgium by flying over the territory of that country ; one has attempted to destroy buildings near Wesel ; others have been seen in the district of the Eifel, one has thrown bombs on the railway near Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

“ I am instructed, and I have the honour to inform your Excellency, that in the presence of these acts of aggression the German Empire considers itself in a state of war with France in consequence of the acts of this latter Power.

“ At the same time, I have the honour to bring to the knowledge of your Excellency that the German authorities will retain French mercantile vessels in German ports, but they will release them if, within forty-eight hours, they are assured of complete reciprocity.

“ My diplomatic mission having thus come to an end it only remains for me to request your Excellency to be good enough to furnish me with my passports, and to take the steps you consider suitable to assure my return to Germany, with the staff of the Embassy, as well as with the staff of the Bavarian Legation and of the German Consulate General in Paris.

“ Be good enough, M. le Président, to receive the assurances of my deepest respect.

“ (Signed) SCHOEN.”

Need I, Gentlemen, lay stress on the absurdities of these pretexts which they would put forward as grievances? At no time has any French aviator penetrated into Belgium, not has any French aviator committed either in Bavaria or any other part of Germany any hostile act. The opinion of Europe has already done justice to these wretched inventions. (Loud and unanimous applause.)

Against these attacks, which violate all the laws of justice and all the principles of public law, we have now taken all the necessary steps; they are being carried out strictly, regularly, and with calmness.

The mobilisation of the Russian army also continues with remarkable vigour and unrestrained enthusiasm. (Unanimous and prolonged applause, all the deputies rising from their seats.) The Belgian army, mobilised with 250,000 men, prepares with a splendid passion and magnificent ardour to defend the neutrality and independence of their country. (Renewed loud and unanimous applause.)

The entire English fleet is mobilised and orders have been given to mobilise the land forces. (Loud cheers, all the deputies rising to their feet.)

Since 1912 *pourparlers* had taken place between English and French General Staffs and were concluded by an exchange of letters between Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening communicated these letters to the House of Commons, and I have the honour, with the consent of the British Government, to acquaint you with the contents of these two documents.

Foreign Office,
November 22, 1912.

My dear Ambassador,

From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not, and ought not to be regarded as, an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war.

You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, it might become essential to know whether it could in that event depend upon the armed assistance of the other.

I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common. If these measures involved action, the plans of the General Staffs would at once be taken into consideration, and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them.

Yours, &c.,
E. GREY.

To this letter our Ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, replied on the 23rd November, 1912 :—

London, November 23, 1912.

Dear Sir Edward,

You reminded me in your letter of yesterday, 22nd November, that during the last few years the military and naval authorities of France and Great Britain had consulted with each other from time to time; that it had always been understood that these consultations should not restrict the liberty of either Government to decide in the future whether they should lend each other the support of their armed forces; that, on either side, these consultations between experts were not and should not be considered as engagements binding our Governments to take action in certain

eventualities ; that, however, I had remarked to you that, if one or other of the two Governments had grave reasons to fear an unprovoked attack on the part of a third Power, it would become essential to know whether it could count on the armed support of the other.

Your letter answers that point, and I am authorised to state that, in the event of one of our two Governments having grave reasons to fear either an act of aggression from a third Power, or some event threatening the general peace, that Government would immediately examine with the other the question whether both Governments should act together in order to prevent the act of aggression or preserve peace. If so, the two Governments would deliberate as to the measures which they would be prepared to take in common ; if those measures involved action, the two Governments would take into immediate consideration the plans of their general staffs and would then decide as to the effect to be given to those plans.

Yours, &c.,

PAUL CAMBON.

In the House of Commons the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs spoke of France amidst the applause of the members in a noble and warm-hearted manner and his language has already found an echo deep in the hearts of all Frenchmen. (Loud and unanimous applause.) I wish in the name of the Government of the Republic to thank the English Government from this tribune for their cordial words and the Parliament of France will associate itself in this sentiment. (Renewed prolonged and unanimous applause.)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs made in particular the following declaration :—

“ In case the German fleet came into the Channel or entered the North Sea in order to go round the British Isles with the object of attacking the French coasts or the French navy and of harassing French merchant shipping, the English fleet would intervene in order to give to French shipping its complete protection in such a way that from that moment England and Germany would be in a state of war.”

From now onwards, the English fleet protects our northern and western coasts against a German attack. Gentlemen, these are the facts. I believe that the simple recital of them is sufficient to justify the acts of the Government of the Republic. I wish,

however, to make clear the conclusion to be drawn from my story and to give its true meaning to the unheard-of attack of which France is the victim.

The victors of 1870 have, at different times, as you know, desired to repeat the blows which they dealt us then. In 1875, the war which was intended to complete the destruction of conquered France was only prevented by the intervention of the two Powers to whom we were to become united at a later date by ties of alliance and of friendship—(unanimous applause)—by the intervention of Russia and of Great Britain. (Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.)

Since then the French Republic, by the restoration of her national forces and the conclusion of diplomatic agreements unswervingly adhered to, has succeeded in liberating herself from the yoke which even in a period of profound peace Bismarck was able to impose upon France.

She has re-established the balance of power in Europe, a guarantee of the liberty and dignity of all.

Gentlemen, I do not know if I am mistaken, but it seems to me that this work of peaceful reparation, of liberation and honour finally ratified in 1904 and 1907, with the genial co-operation of King Edward VII. of England and the Government of the Crown—(applause)—this is what the German Empire wishes to destroy to-day by one daring stroke.

Germany can reproach us with nothing.

Bearing in silence in our bosom for half a century the wound which Germany dealt us we have offered to peace an unprecedented sacrifice. (Loud and unanimous applause.)

We have offered other sacrifices in all the discussions which since 1904 German diplomacy has systematically provoked, whether in Morocco or elsewhere in 1905, in 1906, in 1908, in 1911.

Russia also has given proof of great moderation at the time of the events of 1908, as she has done in the present crisis.

She observed the same moderation, and the Triple Entente with her, when in the Eastern crisis of 1912 Austria and Germany formulated demands, whether against Serbia or against Greece, which still were, as the event proved, capable of settlement by discussion.

Useless sacrifices, barren negotiations, empty efforts, since to-day in the very act of conciliation we, our allies and ourselves, are attacked by surprise. (Prolonged applause.)

No one can honestly believe that we are the aggressors. Vain is the desire to overthrow the sacred principles of right and of liberty to which nations, as well as individuals, are subject ; Italy with that clarity of insight possessed by the Latin intellect, has notified us that she proposes to preserve neutrality. (Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.)

This decision has found in all France an echo of sincerest joy. I made myself the interpreter of this feeling to the Italian Chargé d’Affaires when I told him how much I congratulated myself that the two Latin sisters, who have the same origin and the same ideal, a common and glorious past, are not now opposed to one another. (Renewed applause.)

Gentlemen, we proclaim loudly the object of their attack—it is the independence, the honour, the safety, which the Triple Entente has regained in the balance of power for the service of peace. The object of attack is the liberties of Europe, which France, her allies, and her friends, are proud to defend. (Loud applause.)

We are going to defend these liberties, for it is they that are in dispute, and all the rest is but a pretext.

France, unjustly provoked, did not desire war, she has done everything to avert it. Since it is forced upon her, she will defend herself against Germany and against every Power which has not yet declared its intentions, but joins with the latter in a conflict between the two countries. (Applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.)

A free and valiant people that sustains an eternal ideal, and is wholly united to defend its existence ; a democracy which knows how to discipline its military strength, and was not afraid a year ago to increase its burden as an answer to the armaments of its neighbour ; a nation armed, struggling for its own life and for the independence of Europe—here is a sight which we are proud to offer to the onlookers in this desperate struggle, that has for some days been preparing with the greatest calmness and method. We are without reproach. We shall be without fear. (Loud applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.) France has often proved in less favourable circumstances that she is a most formidable adversary when she fights, as she does to-day for liberty and for right. (Applause.)

In submitting our actions to you, Gentlemen, who are our judges, we have to help us in bearing the burden of our heavy responsibility, the comfort of a clear conscience and the conviction that we have done our duty. (Prolonged applause, all the deputies rising to their feet.)

44. Speech of the Prime Minister on the German Offer, 6 Aug., 1914.

British White Paper, p. 100.

... "What does that amount to? Let me just ask the House. I do so, not with the object of inflaming passion, certainly not with the object of exciting feeling against Germany, but I do so to vindicate and make clear the position of the British Government in this matter. What did that proposal amount to? In the first place, it meant this: That behind the back of France—they were not made a party to these communications—we should have given, if we had assented to that, a free licence to Germany to annex, in the event of a successful war, the whole of the extra-European dominions and possessions of France. What did it mean as regards Belgium? When she addressed, as she has addressed in these last few days, her moving appeal to us to fulfil our solemn guarantee of her neutrality, what reply should we have given? What reply should we have given to that Belgian appeal? We should have been obliged to say that, without her knowledge, we had bartered away to the Power threatening her our obligation to keep our plighted word. The House has read, and the country has read, of course, in the last few hours, the most pathetic appeal addressed by the King of Belgium, and I do not envy the man who can read that appeal with an unmoved heart. Belgians are fighting and losing their lives. What would have been the position of Great Britain to-day in the face of that spectacle, if we had assented to this infamous proposal? Yes, and what are we to get in return for the betrayal of our friends and the dishonour of our obligations? What are we to get in return? A promise—nothing more; a promise as to what Germany would do in certain eventualities; a promise, be it observed—I am sorry to have to say it, but it must be put upon record—given by a Power which was at that very moment announcing its intention to violate its own treaty and inviting us to do the same. I can only say, if we had dallied or temporised, we, as a Government, should have covered ourselves with dishonour, and we should have betrayed the interests of this country of which we are trustees." . . .

45. Proclamation of the Emperor William II. to the German People.

Text in German *Imperial Gazette*, 7 Aug., 1914.

Translated in *Times*, 8 Aug.

“Since the foundation of the Empire it has been for 43 years the object of the efforts of myself and my ancestors to preserve the peace of the world and to advance by peaceful means our vigorous development. But our adversaries were jealous of the successes of our work. There has been latent hostility on the east and on the west and beyond the sea. It was borne by us till now, as we were aware of our responsibility and power. Now, however, these adversaries wish to humiliate us, asking that we should look on with crossed arms and watch our enemies preparing themselves for a coming attack. They will not suffer that we maintain resolute fidelity to our ally who is fighting for its position as a Great Power and with whose humiliation our power and honour would equally be lost. So the sword must decide.

“In the midst of perfect peace the enemy surprises us.* Therefore to arms! Any dallying, any temporizing would be to betray the Fatherland. To be or not to be, is the question for the Empire which our fathers founded. To be or not to be German power and German existence. We shall resist to the last breath of man and horse, and shall fight out the struggle even against a world of enemies. Never has Germany been subdued when it was united. Forward with God, who will be with us as He was with our ancestors!

“Berlin, Aug. 6.

“WILLIAM.”

*It is difficult to believe this statement, in the light of the following facts:—

(1) *The decision of Italy to remain neutral, on the ground that the war was one of aggression by her Allies.*

(2) *The Italian disclosure (on 5 Dec., 1914) that the war had been planned by her Allies for 1913.*

(3) *The warnings given to Germany—(a) by Russia, the first as early as July 25, and (b) by England on July 29, 30, 31, and Aug. 1.*

(4) *The offers of a Conference, made by England, France, Italy and Russia, and the remarkable offers of England.*

(5) *The Russian pledge to take no action while negotiations with Austria continued.*

(6) *The evidence of German designs in 1913 (French Yellow Book, No. 2).*

(7) *The evidence of a German plot to stir up rebellion in South Africa before 1913 (Union of South Africa: Report on the Outbreak of the Rebellion [of 1914]. Parliamentary Papers, 1915 [Cd. 7874]).*

(8) *“The hard fact that though Germany only proclaimed ‘Kriegsgefahrzustand’ on July 31, and mobilisation on Aug. 1, to take effect on Aug. 2, the German troops were across the Luxemburg frontier at dawn on Aug. 2.” (Collected Diplomatic Documents. Preface, p. xi.)*

(9) *Germany’s general preparedness for war, as compared with the Allies, especially England and Russia.*

The real “surprise” for Germany was the proof of her own miscalculations as to the resisting power of her intended victims. This resistance is “treachery” on their part. The “surprise” of the Kaiser reminds us of the naive egoism of the old zoologist: “Cet animal est très méchant; quand on l’attaque, il se défend.”

46. A Neutral's Verdict.

From *New York Times*: reproduced in the *Oxford University Pamphlets*.

[Mr. James M. Beck, formerly Assistant Attorney-General of the United States of America, was asked by the *New York Times* to review the British and German Governments' presentments† of their cases to the world. He argued the case legally, as if it had come before the Supreme Court of the United States. After pointing out that Great Britain produces documentary evidence of her statements, while Germany does not produce it, he gives his judgment as follows :]

These are the facts as shown by the record, and upon them, in my judgment, an impartial court would not hesitate to pass the following judgment :

1—That Germany and Austria in a time of profound peace secretly concerted together to impose their will upon Europe and upon Serbia in a matter affecting the balance of power in Europe. Whether in so doing they intended to precipitate a European war to determine the mastery of Europe is not satisfactorily established, although their whole course of conduct suggests this as a possibility. They made war almost inevitable by (a) issuing an ultimatum that was grossly unreasonable and disproportionate to any grievance that Austria had and (b) in giving to Serbia and Europe insufficient time to consider the rights and obligations of all interested nations.

2—That Germany had at all times the power to compel Austria to preserve a reasonable and conciliatory course, but at no time effectively exerted that influence. On the contrary, she certainly abetted, and possibly instigated, Austria in its unreasonable course.

3—That England, France, Italy and Russia at all times sincerely worked for peace, and for this purpose not only overlooked the original misconduct of Austria but made every reasonable concession in the hope of preserving peace.

4—That Austria, having mobilized its army, Russia was reasonably justified in mobilizing its forces. Such act of mobilization was the right of any sovereign State, and as long as the Russian armies did not cross the border or take any aggressive action no other nation had any just right to complain, each having the same right to make similar preparations.

5—That Germany, in abruptly declaring war against Russia for failure to demobilize when the other Powers had offered to make any reasonable concession and peace parleys were still in progress, precipitated the war.

† In the *British Blue Book and German White Book*.

47. German Proclamations posted in Belgium and France, 1914.

Appendix to Report of Bryce Committee, 1915.

[The following proclamations by German Army Authorities are taken from Appendix C, pp. 269-274. The first was obviously prepared beforehand in Germany. The original text here given is as close a facsimile as possible of the photograph on p. 274. The Committee had before them the originals of the first two proclamations. The French text of the third is in the Sixth Report of the similar Belgian Commission.]

Bekanntmachung.

I. **Waffen und Munition** sind _____ abzugeben.

Wer später in Besitze von Waffen betroffen wird, wird **erschossen**.

II. **Ansammlungen** sind verboten.

III. **Während der Dunkelheit** darf Niemand ohne schriftliche Erlaubnis des Ortskommandanten die Strasse betreten, — sind die Häuser dauernd unverschlossen und beleuchtet zu halten, — desgl die Strassen.

IV. Deutsches Geld, einschl. Papiergeld, hat Jedermann als Zahlung — Mark = 1.25 fr. — anzunehmen. Zuwiderhandlungen werden streng bestraft.

V. **Wer deutsche Soldaten angreift oder mit einem Angriffe bedroht, wird sofort niedergeschossen.**
Divisionskommando.

Proclamation !

I. Toutes les armes et munitions sont à déposer à _____

N'importe quelle personne qui se trouve plus tard en possession d'armes sera **fusillé** instantanément.

II. Tous rassemblement est strictement défendu.

III. Personne doit se trouver dans la rue **pendant qu'il fait nuit** sans permission écrite de la part du commandant allemand du village ou de la ville.

Toutes les **maisons** doivent rester complètement **ouvertes** et **eclairées**, le rues doivent rester éclairés également.

IV. **Je faut accepter** la monnaie allemande, y compris les billets allemands, la Mark au cours de 1 fr. 25. Tous refus sera punis sévèrement.

V. **Sera fusillé sur le coup toute personne qui attaque des soldats allemands** ou qui fait des menaces seulement.

Le Commandant de Division,

Extract from a Proclamation issued to the Authorities of the Commune of the Town of Liège, 22nd August, 1914.

“The inhabitants of the town of Andenne after protesting that their intentions were pacific made a treacherous surprise attack upon our troops.* With my consent the General Commanding has burnt the whole neighbourhood and about 100 people have been shot. I bring this fact to the knowledge of the town of Liège in order that the people of Liège may picture to themselves the fate which awaits them if they take up a like attitude.

“The General Commanding-in-Chief,
“VON BÜLOW.”

* *This assertion is vehemently denied by the witnesses from Andenne. See Appendix A., b. 1, 2, 3 (pp. 23-27).*

Proclamation Posted at Reims on the 12th September, 1914.

PROCLAMATION.

In case fighting takes place to-day or in the near future in the neighbourhood of Reims or in the town itself the inhabitants are warned that they must keep absolutely calm and must make no sort of attempt to take part in the fighting. They must not attempt to attack either isolated soldiers or detachments of the German Army. Raising barricades or taking up the paving of streets is expressly prohibited in order that the movements of troops may not be impeded. In a word, nothing must be attempted which can be in any way injurious to the German Army.

In order adequately to assure the safety of the troops and to guarantee a calm attitude on the part of the population of Reims, the persons named below have been taken as hostages by the German High Command. These hostages will be hanged if the least attempt is made to create a disturbance, and if any infraction of what has been laid down above is committed the town will be wholly or partially burnt and the inhabitants hanged.

On the other hand, if the town keeps absolutely peaceful and calm the hostages and inhabitants will be taken under the protection of the German Army.

By order of the German Authorities,
The Mayor,

Reims, the 12th September, 1914.

Dr. LANGLET.

LIST OF HOSTAGES.

(Eighty names follow, and a note is appended that some other hostages have been taken in addition to the 80 whose names appear. Amongst the 80 names are five priests and a number of persons of distinction.)

48. Petersburg [*sic.*] A Proclamation from the Commander-in-Chief to the Poles, 1914.

Polish Text in *Gazeta Warszawska.*

English Translation by Miss L. Alma Tadema
in *Poland, Russia and the War.*

Poles !

The hour has struck in which the sacred dream of your fathers and forefathers may find fulfilment.

A century and a half ago, the living flesh of Poland was torn asunder, but her soul did not die. She lived in hope that there would come an hour for the resurrection of the Polish Nation and for sisterly reconciliation with Russia.

The Russian Army now brings you the joyful tidings of this reconciliation. May the boundaries be annulled which cut the Polish Nation to pieces ! May that Nation re-unite into one body under the sceptre of the Russian Emperor. Under this sceptre Poland shall be re-born, free in Faith, in language, in self-government.

One thing only Russia expects of you : equal consideration for the rights of those nationalities to which history has linked you.

With open heart, with hand fraternally outstretched, Russia steps forward to meet you. She believes that the Sword has not rusted which, at Grunwald,* struck down the enemy.

From the shores of the Pacific to the North seas, the Russian armies are on the march. The dawn of a new life is breaking for you.

May there shine, resplendent above that dawn, the sign of the Cross, symbol of the Passion and Resurrection of Nations !

(Signed)

Commander-in-Chief General Adjutant,

1 (14) August, 1914.

NICOLAS.

* " God grant that Slavdom, under the leadership of Russia, may resist the Teuton, even as, five centuries ago, Poland and Lithuania resisted him at Grunwald." From speech in the Duma, 9 Aug., 1914, by the leader of the Polish group (*op. cit.* p. 11).

49. Manifesto of the Polish National Council.

Polish Text in *Gazeta Warszawska.*

English Translation by Miss L. Alma Tadema
in *Poland, Russia and The War.*

[The newly-formed Polish National Council issued in Warsaw on November 25th, 1914, the following Manifesto addressed to the Poles in Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia:—]

Countrymen !

When the present war broke out, our nation instantly became

aware that an important page of her history was being turned, that her future hung in the balance.

Poland's most dread foe, who had vowed her complete annihilation, who with approved cunning had, through wide-spread influence, armed all forces against us, suddenly stood forth as the enemy not only of ourselves but of almost the whole of Europe. And we who hitherto alone in desperate daily strife had defended against this enemy the domains of our fathers, all at once saw lifted against him the arms of the world's great powers : Russia, France, England.

We had always understood on which side our place would be. This was now indicated without hesitation by the thought of all sections of the community, by the healthy instinct of the people themselves.

Germany's defeat in this struggle meant victory for us.

Our attitude was responded to by Russia through the Proclamation of the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, a proclamation announcing the fulfilment of our most sacred desires, the joining together of the dismembered body of the Nation, her freedom of being and of growth. This proclamation found an echo among Russia's western allies : the restoration of Poland was seen to be one of the great tasks of this bloody war, a task crying for accomplishment. And our Nation itself received the proclamation with all the more ardour. There stood clearly expressed before the world that purpose which a new dawn had illumined for us at the very outbreak of war.

In presence of this purpose, of the efforts and sacrifices necessary to its realization, all the conflicts and tortures of yesterday faded into the past. One object alone confronted the Nation : the overthrow of Germany's sinister power, the unification of Poland under the sceptre of the Russian Monarch.

Upon this object our Nation concentrated herself, towards this end turned all her endeavours.

* * * * *

. . . Therefore the undersigned this day unite to form a Polish National Council, thus laying the foundation of Poland's political organization, giving expression to her leading tendencies, making her one in purpose and in deed.

The Nation is at this moment with the whole of her strength helping to secure victory over the Germans. Our youth has rushed with ardour into the ranks of that Russian army in which the sons of our land are fighting in hundreds of thousands for the great cause ; the Polish civil population has zealously co-operated with

that army, doing all in its power to assist in the struggle against our mighty foe; and whereas war has carried to our territory unevaded devastation, ruin and destitution, we are bearing the calamity with calm, confident in a luminous morrow for the land of our fathers. The foe did not terrify us by his strength, even when he appeared at the gates of our capital: nor did he deceive us by his promises: the mass of the people preserved an unmoved composure in the presence of danger and replied to his protestations by contempt.

This unshaken attitude was maintained not only in those parts of the country which the enemy did not actually invade, but also there where he took possession, proclaiming his occupation as definite.

The enemy's expectations were equally disappointed in the case of the Polish detachments formed in Austria, to which a certain portion of our ignorant youth was drawn, beguiled by patriotic watch-words. These detachments, destined to decoy the population of the Kingdom into alliance with Austria and Germany, met with ill-will and opposition in all grades of a society possessing clear knowledge of its aims in this portentous hour.

* * * * *

Even to the least enlightened minds it became evident that the few whose hopes were fixed on Austria, as the only State in which our national rights had met with a measure of recognition, over-rated her independence, not having yet discovered that she had stooped to so low a part as to become the mere compliant tool of Prussian policy.

To-day, in face of the manifest will of the Polish Nation, which has with all the strength of its soul come forward against Germany, in face moreover of the fact that Germany alone is the opposing force, independent, conscious of her aims—whereas those who fight with her are simply the instrument of her schemes—in face of all this, any help wilfully given by Poles to Germany or her allies must be looked upon as a transgression against Poland.

The Russian army has, in Austria, already set foot upon earth Polish in pith and marrow, and we are now expecting its advance into those immemorial fastnesses of our Nation which Prussia possesses.

In this grave moment there lies before our fellow-countrymen in those parts the solemn duty of affirming that in thought and deed they are one with the rest of Poland. It behoves them to see to it that the enemy shall not impose upon them even the semblance of an act contrary to the purposes of our Nation. Such

would be accounted any opposition whatsoever of the population against the Russian army, an opposition which Germany will infallibly attempt to rouse in many places.

Countrymen! Since a hundred years, boundaries have divided us which the circle of events have left untouched; to-day, the sons of our soil are being forced to spill the blood of brothers, fighting in the ranks of their own enemies. This war, great, epoch-making, abolishes those boundaries and opens out a radiant morrow of re-union to our nation which in spirit never suffered itself to be divided. This our unity we to-day irrefutably confirm; for the national attitude bears testimony to the fact that in all parts of the great land of our fathers we Poles have one idea, one purpose:—the unification of Poland and the laying of foundations for the free development of the nation.

WARSAW, November 25th, 1914.

[Signed by Zygmunt Balicki and 26 others.]

50. Declaration of the Triple Entente.

French Yellow Book, No. 160.

“The undersigned duly authorised thereto by their respective Governments hereby declare as follows:—

“The British, French and Russian Governments mutually engage not to conclude peace separately during the present war. The three Governments agree that when terms of peace come to be discussed, no one of the Allies will demand terms of peace without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies.”

(Signed) PAUL CAMBON.
COUNT BENCKENDORFF.
EDWARD GREY.

LONDON, 4 Sept., 1914.

51. An Army Order by the Kaiser, 1914.

Times, 1 Oct., 1914.

It is my Royal and Imperial command that you concentrate your energies, for the immediate present, upon one single purpose, and that is that you address all your skill, and all the valour of my soldiers, to exterminate first the treacherous English, and to walk over General French's contemptible little Army. . . .

Headquarters, Aix-la-Chapelle,
August 19, 1914.

The authenticity of this Order has since been denied by the German authorities.

52. The British Declaration, Nov. 9, 1914.

[Speech of the Prime Minister at the Guildhall.]

Times, 10 Nov., 1914.

“We shall never sheathe the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all that she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed. That is a great task worthy of a great nation. It needs for its accomplishment that every man among us, old or young, rich or poor, busy or leisurely, learned or simple, should give what he has and do what he can.”

53. The British Empire at War in 1914. Help from beyond the Seas.

[Universal offers of help were received from the British Colonies at the outbreak of the War, and what they have done since on sea and land throughout the world is well known. As space forbids the inclusion of the offers from all the Colonies, the messages from the Governor-Generals of the great self-governing Colonies are alone given here.]

Parliamentary Papers, 1914.

[Ca. 7607.]

Australia.

In the event of war, Commonwealth of Australia prepared to place vessels of Australian Navy under control of British Admiralty when desired. Further prepared to despatch expeditionary force 20,000 men of any suggested composition to any destination desired by Home Government. Force to be at complete disposal Home Government. Cost of despatch and maintenance would be borne by this Government. Australian Press notified accordingly.—
FERGUSON.

Canada.

My Government, in view of the impending danger of war involving the Empire, are anxiously considering the most effective means of rendering every possible aid. They will welcome any suggestions and advice which the Imperial naval and military authorities may deem it expedient to offer. They are confident that a considerable force would be available for service abroad.—
ARTHUR.

Newfoundland.

Authority is desired by my Ministers to enlist special men service abroad by land and by sea.

Ministers undertake to raise force of naval reserve by the 31st of October to thousand efficient available naval service abroad for one year, and are willing to meet all local expenses.

Several hundred efficient local brigade training officers for enlistment for land service abroad.

Five hundred could, I believe, be enlisted within one month.

Propose to induce serviceable men between eighteen and thirty-six years enlist ; training home defence wherever corps instruction available. Material for further draft would be formed by these.—
DAVIDSON.

New Zealand.

With great enthusiasm and with the acclamation of all parties in Parliament to-night, the Prime Minister made a declaration, which was seconded by Sir Joseph Ward, to the effect that, if necessity unfortunately arose, New Zealand was prepared to send her utmost quota of help in support of the Empire. I am desired to convey these sentiments to His Majesty the King and to the Imperial Government. I will telegraph both utterances later.—
LIVERPOOL.

The Maoris in New Zealand are most anxious to volunteer for war service and my Prime Minister hopes that His Majesty's Government will agree to their doing so. If so, my Prime Minister will place the matter before Cabinet with a view to settling the numbers and the training necessary.—LIVERPOOL.

South Africa.

My Ministers request me to communicate following message to you :—

“The Government, fully recognizing the obligations of the Union in the event of hostilities, wishes to assure you of its preparedness to take all such measures as may be necessary for the defence of the Union. Should His Majesty's Government require the Imperial troops now stationed in South Africa, and who are not connected with garrison artillery in any other part of the world, Ministers would gladly employ the Defence Force of the Union for the performance of the duties entrusted to the Imperial troops in South Africa.”

Ministers further express hope that they will be kept fully informed of further developments.—DE VILLIERS.

54. The British Empire at War in 1914. Loyalty of the Native Races.

[The generous help in men and money immediately and universally offered by the Governments of the Dominions, and by the British race elsewhere throughout the Empire, was sufficiently striking; but the unanimous and spontaneous loyalty of the native races was even more remarkable. A few typical instances are given here.]

[House of Lords, 9th Sept., 1914. Statement by the Secretary of State for India (the Marquis of Crewe).]

Parliamentary Papers, 1914.

[Cd. 7624.]

India.

I received yesterday a summary of offers of service and money made in India to the Viceroy, of which I think it will be interesting if I convey the general gist to your Lordships. The rulers of the Indian Native States, numbering nearly 700 altogether, have with one accord rallied to the defence of the Empire and offered their personal services and the resources of their States. . . .

In fact, there is only one spirit and one movement over the whole of India. The Viceroy has received thousands of telegrams and letters from every quarter expressing loyalty and the desire to assist; and the local administrations have also received a vast number. They have come from every community, from all manner of different associations, religious and political, from all the different creeds, and from countless numbers of individuals offering their resources or their personal services. . . .

I think, my Lords, that we must all agree that this demonstration of true and heartfelt loyalty in India to the King-Emperor and to the Government is one of the most gratifying facts as the outcome of the present war. As we all know, the devotion and the offers of support from the self-governing Dominions of the Crown have been not less striking. Those Governments are manned by people of our own blood, with countless memories and traditions which centre round these islands. But it is, perhaps, even more striking, certainly not less gratifying, that those who speak for the various races in India—races which represent a civilisation of almost untold antiquity; races which have been remarkable in arms, in arts, and in the science of government—should in so whole-hearted a manner rally round the British Government, and, most of all, round the person of their Emperor at such a moment as this; and I am certain that this House will desire to express, through those of us who are entitled to speak for it, its appreciation of their attitude and our recognition of the part that they have played and are playing.

Message from the King Emperor to the Princes and Peoples
of India, 8th September, 1914.

Parliamentary Papers, 1914.

[Cd. 7624.]

TO THE PRINCES AND PEOPLES OF MY INDIAN EMPIRE :

During the past few weeks the peoples of My whole Empire at Home and Overseas have moved with one mind and purpose to confront and overthrow an unparalleled assault upon the continuity of civilisation and the peace of mankind.

The calamitous conflict is not of My seeking. My voice has been cast throughout on the side of peace. My Ministers earnestly strove to allay the causes of strife and to appease differences with which My Empire was not concerned. Had I stood aside when, in defiance of pledges to which My Empire was a party, the soil of Belgium was violated, and her cities laid desolate, when the very life of the French nation was threatened with extinction, I should have sacrificed My honour and given to destruction the liberties of My Empire and of mankind. I rejoice that every part of the Empire is with me in this decision.

Paramount regard for treaty faith and the pledged word of rulers and peoples is the common heritage of England and of India.

Among the many incidents that have marked the unanimous uprising of the populations of My Empire in defence of its unity and integrity, nothing has moved me more than the passionate devotion to My Throne expressed both by My Indian subjects, and by the Feudatory Princes and the Ruling Chiefs of India, and their prodigal offers of their lives and their resources in the cause of the Realm. Their one-voiced demand to be foremost in the conflict has touched My heart, and has inspired to the highest issues the love and devotion which, as I well know, have ever linked My Indian subjects and Myself. I recall to mind India's gracious message to the British nation of goodwill and fellowship, which greeted My return in February, 1912, after the solemn ceremony of My Coronation Durbar at Delhi, and I find in this hour of trial a full harvest and a noble fulfilment of the assurance given by you that the destinies of Great Britain and India are indissolubly linked.

From the Island of Niue.*

[The following extracts were communicated to the Daily Press, usually by the Colonial Office.]

“ I am the Island of Niue, a small child that stands up to help the Kingdom of George V. There are two portions we are offering—(1) money ; (2) men.”

* *In the S. Pacific.*

From Lewanika, Chief of the Barotse Tribe.*

“The Indunas and myself we want call in all our people and then when they here we shall tell them to make ready for the war to help the Government. We shall stand always to be under the English flag.”

* *In N.E. Rhodesia.*

From Griffith, Paramount Chief of Basutoland.

“With regard to this war, which I hear exists between his Majesty the King George V. and the Germans, I ask whether, as my King is engaged in fighting his enemies, I his servant will be doing well to keep aloof watching him being attacked by enemies.”

From an Ashanti Chief.

Sir,—I have the honour to bring in through you for his Majesty’s forces in the present conflict in Europe, an assistance for the War Fund, cash, the sum of £5, five pounds, for myself and my few people therein Obuasi, Ashanti District, and hope same will be considered worthy. It is, of course, my profound duty to perform, and I am proud to perform it, being a British subject. I entertain the confidence and a continuous prayer for a complete victory on the British Empire. I have the honour to be, Sir, your obedient servant,

KWACOE ARTCHER (his X mark),
Chief representing the Omanhene of Apolonian.

From the Emir of Jemaa * to the King.

“God give him greatness.

May his lands stretch north, south, east and west, George, King of England. His Most Gracious Majesty. May he live and reign long.

The reason why I write to his Majesty is because he has helped us from being prisoners of the Germans. We are glad, we thank him. We pray God to help him still and give him more greatness and may he win all the German territories, all their lands, and their properties.

Because you are the helper and protector of the Moslems, the strong, the poor, the rich.

We are all glad and we make joyful because you have taken the lands from the Germans. I, my chiefs, and my subjects on this account, we have sent you a small amount of £40 from our treasury. As we are poor people and have not much. That is why we send you so small an amount. Of our little we hope you will take the wish and take it as great.

* *Nigeria.*

It is to help the soldiers who go to war and fight for you. We pray Almighty God that you may live long and reign long. May He protect you from evil, night and day."

From the Chiefs of Uganda.

"We would ask the Governor to allow us to go to England and join the English Army with our 500 men."

From the Emir of Bornu.

[From] "Shehu Bukar Garbai, son of Shehu Ibrahim, son of Shehu Umar, son of Mohamada Lamino-el-Kanemy, the humble slave of Allah, Emir of Bornu, by the power of the King of England.

I salute Governor Lugard, the representative of the King of England. May God prolong his days.

After that we know that the King of England is waging war against the Germans. The war is close to us at Mora. Who knoweth the ways of Allah. We are warring against proud and stiff-necked people, as the Germans are. In such a case Allah is on our side. Our Lord Mohammed saith : Those who break friendship, kill them like pagans. If you kill them, perhaps they will repent.

I have assisted the Resident with all that has been required : horses, donkeys, bullocks, carriers, and corn, and everything that he asked for. The Resident told me that the King of England wanted them. I am the King of England's servant. Why should I not help him ? After that we know that Governor Lugard wants money for this war.

After that I pray for the victory of the King of England, and for long life for him and for Governor Lugard."

[The Emir then gives £3,200 for the war.]

From a Town in Nigeria.

Translation in *Times*, 21 April, 1915.

From the Council of Lokoja to the Governor-General, Sir Frederick Lugard. Salutations. We are the people of Lokoja. We are the Servants of the King. We are not a great Province. We are a small town. The Emirs give great gifts. They are great people. We give a small gift. We are a small people. See now we give three hundred pounds from out of the Native Treasury. The King must use it as he sees fit to use it. We are the Servants of the King. This year the water will break our roads in the rain time. We will work with our hands and make all things again. No man will ask for payment. We know that our Native Treasury has given the money to the King. If the King makes war we follow him. We are Mahomedans; we pray that God may overthrow the enemies of the King.

Petition of Somali Chiefs.

Translation in *Times*, 10 Nov., 1914.

To His Highness the Governor, through the Hakim of Jubaland.
Salaams, yea, many salaams, with God's mercy, blessing, and peace. After Salaams,

We, the Somali of Jubaland, both Herti and Ogaden, comprising all the tribes and including the Maghavbul, but not including the Tulamuya Ogaden, who live in Biskaya and Tanaland and the Marehan, desire humbly to address you.

In former days the Somali have fought against the Government. Even lately the Marehan have fought against the Government. Now we have heard that the German Government have declared war on the English Government. Behold, our "fitna" against the English Government is finished. As the monsoon wind drives the sand hills of our coast into new forms, so does this news of German evil-doing drive our hearts and spears into the service of the English Government. The Jubaland Somali are with the English Government. Daily in our mosques we pray for the success of the English armies. Day is as night and night is as day with us until we hear that the English are victorious. God knows the right. He will help the right. We have heard that Indian askaris have been sent to fight for us in Europe. Humbly we ask why should not the Somali fight for England also. We beg the Government to allow our warriors to show their loyalty. In former days the Somali tribes made fitna against each other. Even now it is so; it is our custom; yet with the Government against the Germans, we are as one, ourselves, our warriors, our women, and our children. By God it is so. By God it is so. By God it is so.

A few days ago many troops of the military left this country to eat up the Germans who have invaded our country in Africa. May God prosper them. Yet, oh Hakim, with all humbleness we desire to beg of the Government to allow our sons and warriors to take part in this great war against the German evil-doers. They are ready. They are eager. Grant them the boon. God and Mahomed is with us all.

If Government wish to take away all the troops and police from Jubaland, it is good. We pledge ourselves to act as true Government askaris until they return.

We humbly beg that this our letter may be placed at the feet of our King and Emperor, who lives in England, in token of our loyalty and our prayers.

[Here follow the signatures of all the principal Somali chiefs and elders living in Jubaland.]

German Evidence.

From German Newspaper *Der Tag*.
Translated in *Times*, 26 April, 1915.

So many of our calculations have deceived us. We expected that British India would rise when the first shot was fired in Europe, but in reality thousands of Indians came to fight with the British against us. We anticipated that the whole British Empire would be torn to pieces, but the Colonies appear to be closer than ever united with the Mother Country. We expected a triumphant rebellion in South Africa, yet it turned out nothing but a failure. We expected trouble in Ireland, but instead, she sent her best soldiers against us. We anticipated that the party of "peace at any price" would be dominant in England, but it melted away in the ardour to fight against Germany. We reckoned that England was degenerate and incapable of placing any weight in the scale, yet she seems to be our principal enemy.

The same has been the case with France and Russia. We thought that France was depraved and divided, and we find that they are formidable opponents. We believed that the Russian people were far too discontented to fight for their government, and we made our plans on the supposition of a rapid collapse of Russia, but, instead, she mobilised her millions quickly and well, and her people are full of enthusiasm and their power is crushing. Those who led us into all those mistakes and miscalculations have laid upon themselves a heavy responsibility.

55. The Foreign Policy of Greece in 1915.

Greek Text in *Paris*, 21, 22 March, 1915.
Translated in Anglo-Hellenic League Pamphlet: *
Eleutherios Venizelos and English Public Opinion.

[M. Venizelos, the maker of modern Greece, is a European statesman of the first rank. In January, 1915, he addressed, as Prime Minister, the following two memoranda to King Constantine, recommending and justifying the intervention of Greece in the war, on the side of the Triple Entente. On the King's refusal to adopt his policy, he resigned, and laid his case before the nation by publishing his memoranda in the newspapers. At the General Election of 13 June, 1915, he was returned to power by a large majority.]

† The First Memorandum.

ATHENS, January 11, 1915.

YOUR MAJESTY,—

I now have the honour to submit to your Majesty the contents of a communication which the British Minister here made to me with instructions from Sir Edward Grey.

Greece, by his communication, is again confronted with one of the most critical periods in the history of the nation. Until today our policy simply consisted in the preservation of neutrality,

* The first memorandum appeared also in 'Westminster Gazette,' 21 April, 1915

in so far as our treaty obligation with Serbia did not oblige us to depart therefrom. But we are now called upon to participate in the war, no longer in order to fulfil simply moral obligations, but in view of compensations, which if realised will create a great and powerful Greece, such as not even the boldest optimist could have imagined only a few years back. †

In order to obtain these great compensations great dangers will certainly have to be faced. But after long and careful study of the question I end with the opinion that we ought to face these dangers.

We ought to face them chiefly because, even though we were to take no part in the war now, and to endeavour to preserve our neutrality until the end, we should find ourselves exposed to dangers equally serious.

If we allow Serbia to be crushed to-day by another Austro-German invasion, we have no security whatever that the Austro-German armies will stop short in front of our Macedonian frontiers, and that they will not be tempted as a matter of course to come down as far as Salonica. But even if this danger is averted, and we admit that Austria, being satisfied with a crushing military defeat of Serbia, will not wish to establish herself in Macedonia, is there any possible doubt that Bulgaria, at the invitation of Austria, will advance and occupy Serbian Macedonia? And if that were to happen, what would be our position? We should then be obliged, in accordance with our treaty of alliance, to hasten to the aid of Serbia unless we wished to incur the dishonour of disregarding our treaty obligations. Even if we were to remain indifferent to our moral debasement and impassive, we should by so doing have to submit to the disturbance of the Balkan equilibrium in favour of Bulgaria. That Power, thus strengthened, would either now or some time hence be in a position to attack us, when we should be entirely without either a friend or an ally. If, on the other hand, we had, in the circumstances indicated, to go to help Serbia in order to fulfil the duty incumbent on us, we should do so in far more unfavourable circumstances than if we went to her assistance now, because Serbia would already be crushed, and in consequence our aid would be of no, or at best of very little, avail. Moreover, by rejecting now the overtures of the Powers of the Triple Entente, even in the event of victory we should secure no tangible compensation for our support in their struggle.

Let us now examine under what circumstances we ought to take part in the contest. Above all we must seek the co-operation not only of Roumania, but if possible of Bulgaria as well.

† *The original of the words enclosed thus † . . . † is given in the Greek text on p. 93.*

If we should succeed in obtaining this co-operation through an alliance of all the Christian States of the Balkans, not only would every serious danger of local defeat be averted, but their participation would bring a most important influence to bear on the struggle of the Entente Powers. For it is no exaggeration to say that their participation would exercise an important influence in favour of the ascendancy of the latter.

In order that this may be brought about, I think we should make adequate concessions to Bulgaria. So far we have refused even to discuss any concessions whatever by us to Bulgaria. Not only that, but we have declared that we should emphatically oppose any important concessions by Serbia which might disturb the balance of power established in the Balkans by the Treaty of Bucharest.

So far this policy has obviously been the only one to follow.

But now matters have changed. The instant that visions open out for the realisation of our national aims in Asia Minor, it becomes possible to consider some concessions in the Balkans in order to secure the success of such a far-reaching national policy. To begin with, we should withdraw our objections to concessions on the part of Serbia to Bulgaria, even if these concessions extend to the right bank of the Axios (Vardar), and if these concessions do not suffice to induce Bulgaria to co-operate with her former Allies, or at least to induce her to extend a benevolent neutrality to them, I would not hesitate, however painful the severance, to recommend the sacrifice of Kavalla, in order to save Hellenism in Turkey, and with a view to create a real Magna Græcia which would include nearly all the provinces where Hellenism flourished through the long centuries of its history.

This sacrifice, however, would not merely be the price of Bulgaria's neutrality, but would be in exchange for the active participation of Bulgaria in the war with the other Allies. If this suggestion of mine were accepted, the Powers of the Triple Entente should guarantee that Bulgaria would undertake to buy the property of all those inhabitants of this ceded district who wish to emigrate within the boundaries of Greece. At the same time it would be agreed that the Greek population living within the boundaries of Bulgaria should be interchanged with Bulgarian population living within the boundaries of Greece, each State respectively buying their properties. It would be understood that this interchange of population and the purchase of their properties would be carried out by a Commission consisting of five members, one member to be appointed severally by England, France, Russia, Greece and Bulgaria. The actual cession of Kavalla would only take effect

after the fulfilment of all these conditions. In this way a definite ethnological settlement in the Balkans would be arrived at and the idea of a confederation could be realised, or, at any rate, an Alliance with mutual guarantees between the States which would allow them to devote themselves to their economic and other developments, without being primarily absorbed almost exclusively in the task of strengthening their military organisation.

At the same time, as a partial compensation for this concession, one would ask that, if Bulgaria extended beyond the Axios, the Doiran Gheugelis district should be ceded to us by Serbia, so that at least we could acquire, as to Bulgaria, an adequate boundary, since we should be deprived of the present excellent one to the east (of Greek Macedonia).

Unfortunately, on account of Bulgaria's greed, it is not at all certain that, whatever concession we make, we shall be able to satisfy Bulgaria, and lead her to co-operate with her former allies. If we cannot obtain Bulgaria's co-operation, then it would be important we should at least secure Roumania's co-operation, for without this co-operation our joining in the war would be hazardous.

My opinion that we should respond to the suggestion put before your Majesty, with a view to our participation in the war, is also actuated by other motives. In fact, if we remain impassive spectators of the present struggle we not only run the above-mentioned dangers, which the crushing of Serbia will create against us. For, even if a fresh invasion of Serbia were abandoned and Austria, with Germany, should turn their efforts to coming out victorious in the two principal theatres of the war, in Poland and in Flanders, again the danger for us would be great, first, because if they were victorious they would be able to impose the same changes on the Balkans which I have previously indicated as possible results in the event of Serbia's defeat. Beyond that, their victory would mean the death-blow to the free life of all small States, besides the direct damage which we would suffer through the loss of the islands (the Sporades). And again, if the war did not end by a decisive superiority either of the one or the other, but by a return of the *status quo ante bellum*, still, after such a conclusion of the war, swift and sure would come the complete destruction of Hellenism in Turkey. Turkey coming out invulnerable from a war which she had braved against the three big Powers; and emboldened by the feeling of security which her alliance with Germany would give her—an alliance which clearly will last in the future, for such seems Germany's aim—will complete at once and systematically the work of destroying Hellenism in Turkey, driving out the population without pretext and in masses, and appropriating

their possessions. In this she will not only find no opposition from Germany, but will be strengthened by her, inasmuch as Germany will be glad to get rid of a competitor for Asia Minor which she (Germany) covets. The driving away in masses of hundreds of thousands of Greeks living in Turkey will not only destroy these, but drag down in financial ruin the whole of Greece.

On account of all these reasons I conclude our participation in the struggle, under the above conditions, to be absolutely imperative.

It is fraught, as I previously stated, with serious danger. But, unfortunately, for us to keep any longer aloof offers also grave danger, as I have said above. As against the dangers to which we shall expose ourselves in taking part in the war, the expectation soars above all—a legitimate expectation, I hope—that we may save the greater part of Hellenism in Turkey, and that we may create a great and powerful Greece. And even if we do not succeed, we shall at least have our conscience at peace with the conviction that we have struggled to save our race from slavery, that worst of dangers, and fought for the good of humanity and for the liberty of small nations, which German and Turkish rule would irretrievably endanger. And last, even if we fail, we shall preserve the esteem and friendship of powerful nations—those, indeed, who created Greece and so often since have helped and supported her. Whilst our refusal to fulfil our obligations to our ally Serbia would not only destroy our moral standing as a State, and would not only expose us to the above dangers, but would leave us without friends, and destroy all trust in us in the future.

Under these conditions our national life would be endangered.

Your Majesty's most obedient Servant,

ELEUTHERIOS K. VENIZELOS.

The Second Memorandum.

YOUR MAJESTY,

Your Majesty has already been informed of the answer of the Roumanian Government to our proposal for joint action in aid of Servia. This answer signifies, I think, that Roumania will refuse joint military action with us so long as Bulgaria will not share therein. Even if it were possible that Roumania would be satisfied with an official declaration of neutrality by Bulgaria towards a joint Græco-Roumanian action with the Servians, it is altogether unlikely that such an official declaration by Bulgaria could be obtained. Moreover, the General Staff does not seem to be

altogether satisfied about the safety of Græco-Roumanian-Servian co-operation so long as Bulgaria stands apart, even after a declaration of neutrality which she could easily break directly she found an advantage in doing so.

Matters being as they are, I think that the time has come to face with decision the problem of necessary sacrifices so that we may obtain, if possible, a Pan-Balkan co-operation in sharing jointly in the war. Such an action taken in common by the nations of the Balkans would not only secure for them in any event a local ascendancy in the southern theatre of the war, but would furnish a weighty reinforcement to the Powers of the Triple Entente, sufficient probably to turn the scale definitely in their favour in the awful struggle now being carried on.

The cession of Kavalla is assuredly a grievous sacrifice, and I feel in putting it forward a sense of very heavy and heart-felt anguish. But I do not hesitate to propose it as soon as I take in view what the racial compensations are that can be secured to us by this sacrifice.

I feel that the concessions in Asia Minor suggested by Sir Edward Grey can, especially if we submit to sacrifices to Bulgaria, assume such an extent that Greece, already doubled by victorious wars from which she has emerged, would have added to her yet another Greece as great and not less rich. I believe that if we were to ask for the portion of Asia Minor lying westward of a line which, beginning from Cape Phineka in the south, runs through the mountains Ak-Dagh, Kistel-Dagh, Karli-Dagh, Anamus-Dagh, to the Sultan-Dagh and thence through Kessir-Dagh, Tourman-Dagh, Gessil-Dagh, Doumanitsa-Dagh, Mysian Olympus and would end in the Gulf of Adramyti—so long as an outlet were not permitted to us to the Propontis—it would be very probable that our request would be granted. The surface of this country exceeds, by a rough calculation, the 125,000 square kilometres and therefore the extent of Hellas as doubled by the wars.

The portion to be conceded by us (The Kazas, Sharishambant, Kavalla and Drama) has not a surface of more than two thousand square kilometres. In extent, then, it scarcely represents the 60th of what we may possibly get in exchange in Asia Minor, even without taking into consideration the concession of Doyran-Gevgely which we should also demand. It is true that the value of the rich district under consideration is very great, and altogether out of proportion to its extent; but it is clear that it cannot be compared to the value of the portion of Asia Minor, the concession

of which we propose to secure. Even of greater importance is the surrender of Greek population in the ceded district. But if this Hellenic population can be reckoned at 30,000 souls, the Greek population of the portion of Asia Minor claimed by us amounts to more than 800,000 souls; that is to say, more than 25 times as many as the number given up.

Furthermore as I have already explained in my former memorandum, the cession of the district Drama-Kavalla would be under the distinct condition that the Bulgarian Government would buy up the properties of all those who wish to emigrate from the ceded part. Nor do I doubt that all our countrymen in this district would to a man sell their properties and hasten to emigrate to the new Hellas to be created in Asia Minor, increasing and strengthening the Hellenic population there.

Under such a condition, your Majesty, it is my firm conviction that we ought to lay all hesitation aside.

It would be difficult, and altogether unlikely that such an opportunity as appears to-day should present itself again to Hellenism of establishing a complete national settlement.

If we do not take part in the war, whatever may be its result, in all human probability Hellenism in Asia Minor is definitely lost to us. For if the Triple Entente should conquer, its Powers will divide, either among themselves or together with Italy, Asia Minor and the rest of Turkey; and if Germany, together with Turkey, should conquer, not only will the 200,000 Greeks already expelled from Asia Minor have no hope of returning to their homes, but the number of those expelled will have still greater additions. In any event the domination of Germanism will secure for itself the absorption of the whole of Asia Minor.

How, then, is it possible, things being so, for us to allow this opportunity supplied by Divine Providence to pass—the opportunity of realising our most daring national ideals? It is an opportunity of creating a Hellas including nearly all the lands in which Hellenism prevailed during its long life history; a Hellas including extents of the greatest fertility, and assuring for us hegemony in the Aegean Sea.

The members of the General Staff seem, curiously enough, not strongly attracted by these prospects. They fear, so they say, on the one side difficulty in governing so great an extent of new

country, and on the other, lest through our sharing in the war we should be more exhausted than the Bulgarians, and they should take advantage of our exhaustion after the war to attack us.

The first difficulty no one can ignore, but I think that this difficulty cannot lead us to resign the realisation of the ideals of our race in face of the unique opportunity which is presented to us to-day. Moreover, the results, which on the whole have been obtained by Hellenic Government in Macedonia prove that, in spite of many difficulties, such a work does not exceed the powers of Hellas and Hellenism.

The second fear is less justified. The Balkan Wars have proved that we are not reduced by exertion more quickly than the Bulgarians.

It is, however, true that for some term of years, until, that is to say, we organise the whole of our military power upon the basis of the supply of men which the conscription in greater Greece will give us, we shall in the event of war in the Balkan Peninsula find ourselves in need of devoting part of our forces in Asia Minor to guard against any possible local rising there. Such a rising, however, would be altogether unlikely since the Ottoman State being altogether out of account, our Moslem subjects will be excellent and law-abiding citizens. Moreover, any force engaged there will be supplied within a very short space of time by the Hellenic population of Asiatic Hellas. And then it is easy to assure ourselves against all danger from Bulgaria by arranging an oral agreement with the Powers of the Triple Entente, upon the basis of which they should help us, if during the period aforesaid we were to be attacked by Bulgaria.

For my part I think that even without such an agreement we should have nothing to fear as regards Bulgaria after a successful result of a war in which we have shared. Bulgaria would herself be busied in the organisation of new provinces which she would gain. And if Heaven should make her insane enough to wish to attack us, there is no doubt that Servia, which has a binding obligation of alliance with us and reasons for gratitude on account of our behaviour towards her, and which will take very hardly the loss of Macedonia to Bulgaria, will co-operate with us, so that once more we should bring down Bulgaria's arrogant pride, and confine her within bounds which will make her harmless for the future.

It is to be noted, moreover, as regards the concession of Kavalla, that there exists no assurance that Bulgaria will agree to the abandonment of her neutrality to take common action with us and the Servians. It is likely that she will put forward a claim, either to get these concessions simply as an exchange for her neutrality, or to get them at once, before the end of the war, and independently of results proceeding from it.

Neither of these conditions should we be able to accept. But if our sharing in the war should be nullified by the action of the Bulgarians, we should preserve entirely the friendship and sympathy of the Powers of the Triple Entente. And if even in the event of their prevailing, we should not be able to expect such a concession as would be given us in exchange for taking part in the war, we might, nevertheless, safely expect that our interests would meet with their sympathetic support, and that necessary financial help after the war would not be lacking for us.

I should further add, that the whole progress of affairs and the proposal that very wide territorial concessions to us in Asia Minor should be recognised proves to me without the slightest doubt that the activity which has been displayed by New Hellas has attracted to her the confidence of certain Powers which consider her as an important factor in the settlement of the Near East at the moment of the collapse of the Turkish State.

The support of these Powers will supply us with all economic and diplomatic means for facing every difficulty naturally proceeding from so sudden an increase of our territory.

Based upon this support, Greece will be able to step forward firmly in a new and marvellous path of progress open before her.

*To your Majesty, still happily in the prime of manhood, will be given not only to create by your sword the greater Hellas, but to confirm your military success by a complete political organisation of the new State. To you will be given to transmit it to your successor, when the fulness of time demands, and when you have finished a work of such magnitude, as has been given to few kings to achieve.

Your Majesty's most obedient Servant,

ELEUTH. K. VENIZELOS.*

* *The original of the words enclosed * * is given in the Greek text on p. 93.*

Original Greek Text of portions of the Memoranda.

† ΤΟ ΠΡΩΤΟΝ ΠΡΟΣ ΤΟΝ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΑ ΥΠΟΜΝΗΜΑ.

Ἀθήναι τῇ 11 Ἰανουαρίου, 1915.

Μεγαλειότατε,

Ἐλαβα ἤδη τὴν τιμὴν νὰ ὑποβάλω τῇ Ὑμ. Μεγαλειότητι τὸ περιεχόμενον ἀνακρινώσεως, ἣν κατ' ἐντολὴν τοῦ σερ Ἐδουαρδ Γκρέυ μοι ἔκαμεν ὁ Ἄγγλος ἐνταῦθα πρεσβευτής.

Διὰ τῆς ἀνακρινώσεως ταύτης ἡ Ἑλλάς τίθεται καὶ πάλιν ἐνώπιον μιᾶς τῶν κρισιμωτάτων περιστάσεων τῆς ἐθνικῆς αὐτῆς ἱστορίας. Μέχρι σήμερον ἡ πολιτικὴ ἡμῶν συνίστατο εἰς διατήρησιν τῆς οὐδετερότητος, ἐφ' ὅσον τοῦλάχιστον τὴν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἔξοδον δὲν ἐπέβαλλεν ἡμῖν ἡ συμμαχικὴ ὑποχρέωσις πρὸς τὴν Σερβίαν. Ἀλλ' ἡδὴ καλούμεθα νὰ μετᾴσχωμεν τοῦ πολέμου ὄχι πλέον πρὸς ἐκτέλεσιν ἠθικῶν ἀπλῶς ὑποχρεώσεων, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ἀνταλλάγμασι, τὰ ὅποια πραγματοποιούμενα θὰ δημιουργήσουν μιᾶν Ἑλλάδα μεγάλην καὶ ἰσχυρὰν τοιαύτην ὅποιαν οὐδ' οἱ μᾶλλον αἰσιόδοξοι ἠδύνατο νὰ φαντασθῶσι καὶ πρὸ ὀλίγων ἀκόμη ἐτῶν....†

*Εἰς τὴν Ὑμετέραν Μεγαλειότητα, τελουῦσαν, εὐτυχῶς, ἔτι ἐν ὄλῃ τῇ ἀκμῇ τῆς ἀνδρικῆς ἡλικίας, θὰ δοθῇ ὄχι μόνον νὰ δημιουργήσετε διὰ τῆς σπάθης Ὑμῶν τὴν Μεγαλειτέραν Ἑλλάδα, ἀλλὰ καὶ νὰ στερεώσετε τὸ στρατιωτικὸν κατόρθωμα δι' ἀρτίας πολιτικῆς ὀργανώσεως τοῦ νέου Κράτους καὶ νὰ παραδῶτε αὐτὸ εἰς τὸν Διάδοχον Ὑμῶν, ὅταν ἐπιστῇ τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου, ἀφοῦ συντελέσετε ἔργον τόσον ὑπερφυῶς μέγα, ὅσον εἰς ὀλίγους ἐδόθη Βασιλεῖς νὰ ἐπιτελέσουν.

Τῆς Ὑμ. Μεγαλειότητος εὐπειθέστατος θεράπων.

ΕΛΕΥΘ. Κ. ΒΕΝΙΖΕΛΟΣ.*

56. British Official Report on German Outrages in the War, 1914.

Report of the Committee on Alleged German Outrages, p. 60.

[On 15 Dec., 1914, the British Government appointed a committee, presided over by Viscount Bryce, formerly British Ambassador to the United States of America, to report on the evidence collected by the Government on this subject. This evidence included the depositions (all legally attested) of more than 1,200 witnesses, a number of diaries taken from dead German soldiers, and a number of German official proclamations posted in Belgian and French towns. The Committee tested this evidence by the principles of English and American law; and in their report analyse and summarise it, and give their conclusions as follows.]

It is proved—

- (i) That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organised massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.

- (ii) That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.
- (iii) That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German Army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, being indeed part of a system of general terrorization.
- (iv) That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners, and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the White Flag.

Sensible as they are of the gravity of these conclusions, the Committee conceive that they would be doing less than their duty if they failed to record them as fully established by the evidence. Murder, lust, and pillage prevailed over many parts of Belgium on a scale unparalleled in any war between civilised nations during the last three centuries.

Our function is ended when we have stated what the evidence establishes, but we may be permitted to express our belief that these disclosures will not have been made in vain if they touch and rouse the conscience of mankind, and we venture to hope that as soon as the present war is over, the nations of the world in council will consider what means can be provided and sanctions devised to prevent the recurrence of such horrors as our generation is now witnessing.

We are, &c.,

BRYCE.

F. POLLOCK.

EDWARD CLARKE.

KENELM E. DIGBY.

ALFRED HOPKINSON.

H. A. L. FISHER.

HAROLD COX.

57. The Choice before Italy.—Speech of the poet
D'Annunzio at Rome, May, 1915.

Times, 15 May, 1915.

[During the days immediately preceding the Italian declaration of war, a few Italian politicians, reputed corrupt, were working against their Government in favour of Austria and Germany ; but the popular feeling was overwhelmingly in favour of war. This feeling was thus expressed by the poet D'Annunzio in a speech to a large crowd at Rome.]

“ Romans, Italians, brethren in faith and in anxiety, my friends of to-day and my comrades of yore : It is not to me that you address this greeting of ardent courtesy, of generous recognition. Not me do you salute, but the spirit that guides, the love that inspires me, the idea which I serve.

“ Could he, Garibaldi, the Liberator, descend from the Janiculum, would he not brand as cowards and traitors, would he not set the seal of infamy on all those who to-day in secret and openly work to disarm our Italy, to debauch the country, to thrust her again into servitude, to nail her anew on her cross, or to leave her agonising on her bed, that seemed at times an open bier ?

“ Can we allow aliens, those in our midst and those without, can we permit the enemies at home, or intruders, to impose this kind of death on a nation which but yesterday in a thrill of power raised by her sea the symbol of her most exalted epic, the statue of her true will which is the will of Rome ? As yesterday the pride of Italy was wholly turned towards Rome, so to-day towards Rome is turned Italian anguish. For three days I know not what odour of treason has begun to suffocate us. No ; we will not be a museum, an hotel, a summer solace, a horizon painted with Prussian blue for international honeymoons ; a pleasant market for buying and selling, haggling and defrauding ! Our genius calls us to put our stamp on the fused and confused matter of a new world. Across our heavens passes again the breath that inspired the prodigious lines in which Dante represents the flight of the Roman eagle, O citizens ! the flight of the eagle, it is yours !

“ Let the strength of Rome overthrow the tables of dishonest traders and forgers ; let Rome find anew in the Forum the daring of Cæsar crying, ‘*Alea jacta est*’ on the ruddy table of the earth.

“ I saw the fire of Vesta, O Romans, lit yesterday in the great steel works of Liguria, around the forges which flamed ceaselessly night and day. The fountain of Juturna, O Romans, I saw its waters run to temper armour, to chill the drills that hollow out the

bore of guns. Let Italy arm not for parade but for mortal combat. Too long she has heard the sighs of those who far away suffer bodily hunger, hunger of the soul, shameful outrages, every torture.

“ Fifty years ago this evening at this very hour the Thousand of Garibaldi fell asleep to awaken at dawn for the onward march, not against Destiny, but towards the destiny which for them was fused with the light of the rising sun into one sole splendour. Let Rome awaken to-morrow in the sun of her need, and shout the cry of her right, the cry of her justice, the cry of her claim to all the earth that awaits her as an ally against barbarism.

“ On which side is victory ? asked our young poet Mameli, who fell under your walls, while he ardently desired to die on the Eastern Alps with his face to the Austrian foe. Youth of Rome ! Believe what we believe, believe above all and against all that God indeed created victory to be the handmaid of Rome. As it is Roman to do and to suffer strong things, so it is Roman to conquer (A voice : ‘ Or to die ! ’) and to live in the eternal life of the mother country. Sweep, therefore, sweep away all filth ; cast into the sewer all that is putrefying. Long live Rome without shame ! Long live Italy, grand and pure ! ”

58. Italy declares War on Austria, 23 May, 1915.

Daily Telegraph, 25 May, 1915.

[On 4 May Italy denounced the Triple Alliance, on the ground of Austria's breach of it, and on 23 May declared war.]

A declaration has been made as from the 4th of this month to the Imperial and Royal Government of the grave motives for which Italy, confident in her good right, proclaimed as annulled, and henceforth without effect, her treaty of alliance with Austria-Hungary, which had been violated by the Imperial and Royal Government, and resumed her entire liberty of action in this respect.

The Government of the King, firmly resolved to provide by all means at its disposal for the safeguarding of Italian rights and interests, cannot fail in its duty to take against every existing and future menace the measures which events impose upon it for the fulfilment of the national aspirations.

His Majesty the King declares that he considers himself from to-morrow in a state of war with Austria-Hungary.

59. Italy and her new Allies, May, 1915.

Times, 31 May, 1915.

[The following telegrams were exchanged between the British, French and Italian Governments.]

Mr. Asquith to Signor Salandra :—

At this great moment, I desire to express to your Excellency the happiness felt by H.M. Government and by the people of Great Britain that the long standing friendship between our two countries has ripened into a more intimate relationship.

The Italian people have always stood for freedom and for the great ideals of humanity, and to-day we rejoice in their decision to participate in the struggle, which the nations upholding these ideals are waging to preserve them from utter destruction.

Now that the will of the Italian people has been so clearly expressed, I know that the valour of the Italian Army and Navy will make the achievement of final victory more speedy and more sure.

We are proud that Italy has joined the Allies, and that the decision has been taken under your Excellency's auspices.

Signor Salandra replied :—

In the name of the Italian Government I express to your Excellency the liveliest gratitude for the noble words with which you so kindly recognize the lofty motives with which Italy is entering the European conflict. We wish above all that a long era of liberty and peace may open for Europe re-ordered on the basis of respect for the highest principles of nationality. We hope to contribute to the speedier realization of this ideal with all our forces associated in close and lasting solidarity with those of the great British nation, to which the Italian people are bound by long-standing traditions of mutual sympathy undisturbed by any diversity of interests.*

I beg your Excellency to accept the personal sentiments of my profound respect.

[Similar messages passed between King Victor Emmanuel and King George.]

* *The British nation had always been in sympathy with the cause of Italian freedom, and had hastened in 1861 to recognise the new Italian kingdom, "acting," in the words of the British Government despatch, "on the principle of respecting the independence of the nations of Europe."* (Annual Register, 1861).

The King of Italy to the President of the French Republic :—

On entering upon the campaign I sent your Excellency my greeting and good wishes. My telegram crossed a message in which your Excellency, on the occasion of a fresh brotherhood in arms, recalled the traditions and ties which united France and Italy in the past, and which reunite them to-day in a new ideal, that of the liberation of oppressed peoples and the defence of our common civilization.

I am deeply touched by your Excellency's eloquent words, and I desire to renew to your Excellency and to France the assurance of my regard and my fervent wish that the victory of our Armies may lead to the establishment of lasting peace, based on the accomplishment of national claims, on justice, and on liberty.

I send your Excellency the assurance of my cordial friendship.

VICTOR EMMANUEL.

60. Feeling towards England in a Russian Army, May, 1915.

Times, 7 June, 1915.

[In the recent fighting in South Poland the Russian Army, while changing front, attacked the pursuing Austro-German forces, inflicting a loss of between 20,000 and 30,000 men. On the arrival of the *Times* special correspondent a review was ordered on 30 May "of two heroic battalions in which every man was stated to have killed two of the enemy during this last action. This regiment, which is one of the oldest in the Russian Army, formed a square and was addressed by its Colonel. As an indication of the feeling towards England on this front his words seem worth quoting" :—]

"Attention, officers and soldiers !

We have to-day the honour to receive the representative of the great English nation, our faithful Ally, who is now fighting with us for the good of us all, to punish our common and treacherous enemy. They are dear to our hearts because they are conducting this war with such sacrifices and such incredible bravery. It is a great pleasure and distinction for our regiment to see among us the representative of the country where dwell the bravest of the brave. This regiment, beloved of Suvoroff, will always do its utmost to uphold the reputation of Russian arms that they may be worthy to fight this war shoulder to shoulder with their noble Allies in the British Army.

Officers and my brave soldiers, a hearty cheer for the King of England, and long life to King George V."

APPENDIX.

61. German plans for the invasion of England.

APPENDIX.

61. German Plans for the invasion of England.
Extracts from the *Tornisterwörterbuch*.*

[The book from which the following extracts are taken has been relegated to an appendix, because, though somewhat interesting, it does not possess quite the same status as the other documents. Its nature is shown by the table of contents, of which a translation is given here. It belonged to a German prisoner, who gave it, in hospital, to Captain the Rev. G. A. Wells, of the Canadian Army. Captain Wells kindly gave me three pages of the book, and told me much about the rest. I am also indebted for information to a British journalist who cross-examined the prisoner. The book is evidently compiled for the use of German soldiers who should find themselves in England. There is some evidence, from prisoners, that it was issued officially.† The other books found in the German soldiers' packs also bear no official publication mark, but are of a pattern. Many books identical with this copy, save in the substitution of French words for English, have apparently been found on German prisoners. The matter of the book shows much careful preparation and military knowledge. It is undoubtedly a genuine publication, which means business; and looks as if it were authorised for the use of a German force invading England. Extracts from it, and enlarged facsimiles of the text, with notes, were recently published with comic illustrations by the *Echo*, under the title of the *Huns' Handbook for the Invasion of England*, and I am indebted to Mr. Rowan, the Editor, for the kind present of the two facsimile pages given here from the dialogue part of the book.]

* *Knapsack Dictionary*. *Tornister* is a (soldier's) knapsack.

† Some of the prisoners in the Canadian Hospital stated that only Officers and N.C.O's. used the book.



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* *The pattern described is given as that of Summer, 1912.*

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Das Quartermachen 159

Sorgen Sie, daß meinen Anordnungen unbedingt Folge geleistet wird take care that my orders are strictly obeyed (teif fār dhāt māi ōr'bd̄rj ār f̄trā'ft̄e ʔhei'ḃ).

Ich mache Sie dafür verantwortlich I shall hold you responsible for that (āi f̄chāl ho'ld jū r̄ēf̄p̄w'n̄f̄i b̄l f̄sr dhāt).

Jede Widerseßlichkeit wird streng bestraft any resistance will be severely punished (ö'n° r̄ēf̄f̄'f̄t̄n̄f̄ w̄ll b̄i f̄ē-wl'r̄l° p̄w'n̄f̄st̄).

Die Gemeinde wird eine empfindliche Kriegsteuer bezahlen the community (od. municipality) will have to pay a heavy contribution (dh° f̄mjū'n̄ēte, mi'ūn̄f̄gä-pā'f̄te w̄ll h̄āw tū pei ā h̄ē'w° f̄w̄ntr̄ēh̄jū'f̄ch̄n).

Machen Sie das den Einwohnern bekannt! make that known to the inhabitants by public notice! (m̄ēf̄ dhāt no'w̄n tū dh̄i l̄nh̄ā'h̄ē't̄nt̄f̄ b̄āi p̄w'bl̄f̄ no'u'f̄f̄).

Wer sich an einem meiner Leute vergreift, verwirft das Leben whoever makes an attempt on one of my soldiers will be condemned to death (h̄ūō'w̄r me'f̄f̄_ōn_ātō'mt_ōn w̄w̄n_ōw māi fo'u'ld̄ḡrj w̄ll b̄i f̄ōnd̄ē'md tū b̄ēth).

Das Dorf wird dem Erdboden gleich gemacht the village will be razed (dh° wl'l̄ēdḡ w̄ll b̄i re'f̄b̄).

Der Ortsvorsteher wird unfehlbar erschossen the mayor will certainly be shot (dh° mār, w̄ll f̄ōr't̄ēnl̄e b̄i f̄ch̄wt).

Ich muß einen Zweispänner nach ... haben I want to have a two-horse carriage to ... (āi w̄w̄nt tū h̄āw_ā tū'hō'r̄f̄ f̄ā'r̄ēdḡ tū).

Zu einer Stunde muß der Wagen zur Abfahrt bereit sein the carriage must be ready to start within an hour (dh° f̄ā'r̄ēdḡ m̄w̄ßt b̄i r̄ē'd° tū f̄t̄ārt w̄ldh̄'l'ū_ōn_āu'r).

Sorgen Sie nur für einen zuverlässigen Kutscher! above all I want to have a reliable driver (āb̄w̄'w_ōl_āi w̄w̄nt tū h̄āw_ā r̄ē'l̄āi'ōh̄l d̄rāl'w̄r).

Zwei Juriere bleiben bis zum Eintreffen der Truppen hier two non-commissioned officers (od. men) will stay here till the troops arrive (tū n̄w̄n'ōm̄l'f̄ch̄ōnd_ō'f̄ēf̄r̄j, m̄ēn w̄ll f̄te' h̄i'r̄ t̄ll dh° trūp̄_ā r̄āi'w̄).



172 Beitreibung

5. Beitreibung requisitioning (rɛfwɛʃl'ʃɔ'nɪnŋ).

Herr Bürgermeister. ich habe Befehl, hier Lebensmittel und Furance zu requirieren Mr. Mayor (od Sir), I have orders to carry out a requisition of food and forage in this place (m'l'ʃtʳ mār, ʃōʳ, ʌl hām_ōʳ'dʳɪʃ tū fā're aūt_ʌ rɛfwɛʃl'ʃɔ'n_ʷ fūd_ʷnd fō'rɛbQ_ɪn dhlʃ pleiʃ)

Ich hoffe, Sie werden mich nicht zwingen, Gewalt anzuwenden I hope you will not compel me to apply force (ʌl hoʊp jū wɪl nōt kɔmpɛ'l mɪ tū ʌplāi' fōʳʃ).

Schaffen Sie binnen einer Stunde hier zur Stelle: within an hour you have to furnish on the spot (wɪdhl'n_ʷn_ aūr jū hām tū fōʳ'nɪʃɔ_ʷn dhe ʃpōt):

- . Stück Rindvieh ... head of cattle (hɛd_ʷ kʌtl),
- . Zentner Hafer, Mehl, Heu ... hundredweights of oats, flour, hay (hɔndrɛdweɪtʃ_ʷn_ouʃ, flāur, heɪ),
- . Hektoliter Wein, Kartoffeln ... hectolitres of wine, potatoes (hɛ'tɔlɪtʳɪʃ_ʷn wain, pɔ'teɪ'toʊʃ).

Zum Fortschaffen muß die Gemeinde die erforderlichen Wagen stellen the community will have to furnish the wag(g)ons necessary for the transport (dhe kɔmjū'nɛtɛ wɪl hām tū fōʳ'nɪʃɔ dhe wā'gʊnʃ nɛ'ʃɛʃʳɛ fōʳ dhe tra'ŋʃpōʳt).


Wagen und Pferde können sogleich zurückkehren the wag(g)ons and horses may immediately go back (dhe wā'gʊnʃ_ʷnd hōʳʃɛʃ mɛɪ ɛml'dɛʌtɛ goʊ bʌk).

Falls Sie sich weigern, werde ich Sie arretieren in case of refusal you will be arrested (ɪn feiʃ_ʷn rɛfjū'ʃɪ jū wɪl bi ʌrɛ'ʃtɛd).


Die erforderlichen Gegenstände werde ich dann durch meine Leute da wegnehmen lassen, wo ich sie finde I shall cause my soldiers to take the articles required where I shall find them (ʌl ʃɔʌl kɔʃ māl ʃoʊ'ɪdQʳɪʃ tū teɪʃ dhl ʌʳ'tɪʃɪ hɔwār_ʌl ʃɔʌl faind dhɛm).

Sie sehen also, daß Ihre Weigerung nichts nützen würde you see that your refusal would be of no use (jū ʃɪ dhʌt jūr rɛfjū'ʃɪ wūd bi ʷn noʊ jūʃ).


Etwaige Widerseßlichkeit der Einwohner würde streng bestraft any resistance of the inhabitants would be



Enlarged facsimiles of two pages from the Dialogues (Gespräche).







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